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Abstract
Deposits are the single largest source of funding for banks and are thus key to the stability
of the banking system. Deposit flows and deposit rates are two mechanisms through which
depositors discipline banks from excessive risk taking thus keeping the banking system
stable.
In Chapter 1, I examine aggregate deposit inflows, outflows, and the reallocation of
deposits in the banking system to further our understanding of banking stability. I find
that on average deposit inflows are nearly three times larger and twice more volatile
than outflows. Deposit flows vary with business cycles and market conditions, across
deposit types, and cross-sectionally. Moreover, there is considerable heterogeneity in
flows across deposit types. I also find that the largest banks attract and retain more
deposits compared to smaller banks, and deposits are reallocated from small to largest
banks. Deposits are also reallocated to banks which offer higher deposit rates, have lower
insolvency risk assets, and low capital levels. My findings imply that deposit inflows
and the heterogeneity in depositors are important in understanding banking stability.
Moreover, at the aggregate level deposits are reallocated to banks that provide more
utility to depositors, suggesting some evidence of market discipline.
In Chapter 2, I examine the role of bank accounting information in addressing information
asymmetry problems between banks and depositors. I present evidence that rates on
large, time deposits (CDs) increase with loan loss provisions (LLPs), especially non-
discretionary provisions. These effects are pronounced from the financial crisis on-wards,
where timelier provisioning reduces deposit rates. Furthermore, provisioning by banks
that experience high loan growth and are profitable increases deposit rates, while banks
that are conservative in accounting for their loan charge offs experience lower deposit
rates. Additionally, in contrast to discretionary provisions, non-discretionary provisions
that contribute to economic capital (in excess of Tier 2 regulatory capital) reduce deposit
rates. These findings support the use of accounting information in providing market
discipline, the third pillar in the regulatory framework proposed in the Basel III accord.
vi
1 Gross Deposit Flows
1.1 Introduction
Instability in banking is typically associated with deposit outflows. Recent case-study
evidence reveals a richer set of details associated with these outflows. The rate of outflows
differs across deposit types. Deposit insurance and duration of depositor relationships
slow the rate of deposit outflows (Iyer and Puri (2012), and Iyer, Puri, and Ryan (2016)).
Furthermore, deposit inflows occur alongside deposit outflows (Martin et al. (2018)).
Moreover, recent theoretical work also suggests the reallocation of deposit outflows from
distressed banks to healthy banks (Egan, Hortaçsu, et al. (2017)). Understanding stability
in banking therefore requires moving beyond examining net flows (deposit outflows) at
distressed banks or during crises periods. It requires an understanding of gross deposit
flows - the rates of inflows and outflows, their persistence and volatility, cross-sectional
variation across deposit types, time-series variation across the business cycle and market
conditions, and how inflows and outflows combine to reallocate deposits in the banking
system.
Moreover, we need to understand whether the magnitude of these gross deposit flows
is large enough to cause instability to the banking system as a whole, and how do these
deposit flows measure against proposed regulatory changes to liquidity and stable funding.
This paper examines gross deposit flows to answer some of these questions and to establish
facts that can further our understanding of banking stability.
I begin by examining aggregate deposit inflows and outflows to understand the mag-
nitude, volatility, and persistence of deposit flows. Using quarterly bank level data from
1984-2017, I find the following: The average rate of deposit inflows (3.7%) is more than
three times the the average rate of deposit outflows (1.1%). Deposit inflows are also
more than twice as volatile as deposit outflows.1 Moreover, I find that entries (de-novo
1I place a caveat here that my measure of the rates and volatility of deposit flows are downward
biased since my fundamental unit of analysis is the bank and thus I compute only inter-bank deposit
flows and do not include intra-bank deposit flows.
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banks) and exits (failures or mergers) do not have a significant effect on aggregate deposit
inflows or outflows in the banking system, respectively. Deposit inflows and outflows are
however persistent across banks and time periods. On average only 50% of the deposits
that come into a bank during a quarter, stay with the bank for an additional quarter. I
also find that during any given time period, including recessions, there are simultaneous
inflows and outflows of deposits. Even in periods of net deposit outflows there are deposit
inflows. While Martin et al. (2018) find evidence on simultaneous inflows and outflows of
deposits at a failing bank, I find that simultaneous inflows and outflows of deposits exist
at the aggregate industry level. These findings suggest the importance of considering
deposit inflows in addition to outflows when examining the effect of deposit flows and
bank stability.
Deposit inflows and outflows also vary across deposit types. The rates of inflows (3.9%)
and outflows (1%) of core deposits (insured) are lower than the corresponding rates (7.3%
for inflows and 5.2% for outflows ) for large time-deposits (uninsured).2 These aggregate
level deposit outflows (run-off) rates are much lower than those considered in the Basel III
regulations on liquidity and stable funding (Basel III, 2013). Basel III regulations assume
a run-off rate of 5% (minimum of 3%) for stable funding sources, which in my case are
core deposits, and a run-off rate of 10% or higher for less stable funding sources, or in my
case large time-deposits. These findings suggest that the deposit run-off rates considered
in the Basel regulations may be more conservative than the run-of rates observed. Core
deposit inflows and outflows are also less volatile than large time-deposits. However, in
dollar terms, core deposit inflows are nearly three times the inflows of large time-deposits,
while outflows are of comparable magnitude. These findings indicate that despite explicit
withdrawal restrictions on large time-deposits, they are more withdrawal-prone compared
to core deposits, even though the rates of outflows may not be as high as considered in
the Basel regulations.
2Core Deposits include total transaction deposits, savings deposits, and small time-deposits. Large
time-deposits are defined as time deposits ≥ $100,000 prior to Q1,2010 and time deposits ≥ $250,000
since.
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Across deposit types, Martin et al. (2018) find evidence that outflows of uninsured
deposits at a failing bank positively affects the outflows of insured deposits. They also
find that the failing bank manages to replace some of the outflows in uninsured deposits
with insured deposits. However, at the banking system level I do not find any evidence
of contemporaneous relation between outflows of core and large time-deposits, though
they are non-contemporaneously related. I also find that there is a contemporaneous
and lagged substitution effect between core deposits and large time-deposits. While
core deposit outflows are correlated with large time-deposit inflows, large time-deposit
outflows are only non-contemporaneously correlated core deposit inflows. By looking at
the aggregate level of deposit flows I find that such a substitution effect is not unique to
failing banks. Moreover, the substitution effect of core deposit outflows and large time-
deposit inflows is primarily evident in banks with low capital, high levels of NPA (Non-
performing assets), and banks with low levels of loan charge-offs. So while there might
be a substitution effect between core and large time-deposits at times, the directionality
and magnitude of substitution various with bank distress levels. These findings have
important implications in designing regulations on the sources of funding distressed banks
can access, which may affect the costs borne by the regulatory agency in case of failure
of the depository institution.
Deposit inflows and outflows also vary with market and economic conditions, and
across deposit types. I find that the aggregate rate of deposit inflows increases during
periods of high stock market returns, and the rate of deposit outflows decreases during
periods of high economic activity. Across deposit types, I find that the rate of inflows of
core deposits increases during periods of high stock returns, suggesting a wealth effect.
On the other hand, the rate of inflows of large time-deposits increases during periods
of high market volatility, suggesting that depositors view banks as “safe havens” during
periods of market uncertainty. High economic activity also affects core deposits and
large time-deposits differently. For core deposits, while both the rate of deposit inflows
and outflows decrease, for large time-deposits only the rate of outflows decreases. Large
time-deposits are also more sensitive to changes in the benchmark rate of return (the
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federal funds rate), compared to core deposits. While Egan, Hortaçsu, et al. (2017) find
that the demand for both insured and uninsured deposits are price inelastic, 3 I find
that increases in the federal funds rate leads to higher inflows and lower outflows for
large time-deposits. However, there is no such effect observed for core deposits. These
findings further elaborate on the sensitivity of different deposit types to changes in macro
economic and market conditions, and benchmark rates of return.
Thus far my focus has been on the inflows and outflows of deposits in the banking
system. However, in addition to inflows and outflows there is also a reallocation of
deposits amongst banks. Egan, Hortaçsu, et al. (2017) give an example where the market
share of uninsured deposits drops for a distressed bank while simultaneously the market
share of uninsured deposits for a healthy bank increases. They suggests there might be
a movement of deposits from one bank to another. I next examine the cross-sectional
variation in deposit flows, and in addition to deposit inflows and outflows, I also look
at the reallocation of deposits within banks of similar size groups. The ratio of deposit
inflows to outflows decreases monotonically from the largest to the smallest bank. For
every $1 of outflows, the largest banks attract $9, while the smallest banks only attract
roughly $2.6. On the other hand the the ratio of deposit reallocation to outflows increases
monotonically from the largest to the smallest bank. For every $1 of outflow for the
largest banks, $1.89 are reallocated amongst the largest banks, while for the smallest
banks $1.96 are reallocated. The trends are consistent for both core deposits and large
time-deposits. These findings suggest that the largest banks both attract and retain more
deposits compared to the smaller banks, for every dollar of deposit outflow. Since the
largest banks also have the most number of branches, these higher ratios of deposit inflows
to outflows at the largest banks suggests the importance of branch networks, not only
in in their ability to attract deposits, but also in reducing information asymmetry and
monitoring costs (Aguirregabiria et al., 2017), and thus retaining more deposits. This
monotonic trend in the ratios of deposit inflows-to-outflows and reallocation-to-outflows
3They calibrate a model of deposit demand using parameters for interest rates offered and probability
of default to arrive at price elasticity.
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to cannot be captured with deposit growth rates, or deposit market share alone, and
is thus valuable in understanding the funding risks faced by community banks vis-a-vis
larger banks.
In addition to the reallocation of deposits within bank size groups, deposits are also
reallocated across groups. I find that nearly 60% of the reallocation of core deposits is
inter-group, while for large time-deposits it is only 30% , the rest being intra-group. I
find that while the rates of reallocation of large time-deposits is larger than that for core
deposits, large time-deposits are reallocated across banks of similar size. This suggests
that the reallocation of large time-deposits is largely due to heterogeneity in bank-level
dynamics within similar size groups. These figures however do not give us the direction
of deposit flows. I develop on the methodology used by Meller and Metiu (2017) to
measure synchronization of economic cycles across countries, to ascertain the direction
of deposit flows. I find that deposits flow from smaller banks to larger banks, and this
is largely evident for core deposits, post Riegle-Neal (RN) and post Gramm-Leach-Bliley
(GLB), while there is no such effect for large time-deposits. One possible explanation
for this effect could be the “economies of scale” enabled by RN which allowed banks
to acquire other banks and operate across state boundaries and become larger, and the
“economies of scope” enabled by GLB that allowed banks to engage in investment banking
and insurance business in additional to commercial banking activities. Both the scale and
scope effects allowed the banks to establish relationships with depositors, and hence the
effect is evident more for core deposits which are more relationship based compared to
large time-deposits. Combining the findings on the rates of inflows and outflows across
bank size groups with the magnitude and direction of deposit outflows at smaller banks,
these findings suggest that smaller banks have been losing deposits to the largest banks,
and may be more vulnerable to deposit outflows and funding shortages compared to their
larger counterparts.
To further understand the reallocation of deposits within the banking system, I look
at deposit flows across bank characteristics. I use the basic framework of Egan, Hortaçsu,
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et al. (2017) to interpret my results. They suggest a model where insured and uninsured
depositors choose between differentiated banks based on individual utility maximizing
preferences. This utility is derived from deposit rates offered, the probability of default,
and the banks’ ability in using these deposits effectively. And, depositors are run-prone
and can move their deposits from one bank to another.
I first look at utility derived from deposit rates offered. Deposit rates offered can be
viewed in two ways. One the one hand DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) suggest that banks
that enjoy deposit rate advantages (lower deposit rates than competitors in the same
market) should have lower leverage, or in my case lower levels of deposits.4 Deposit rate
advantages could arise for instance from lower servicing costs on loans and deposits. It
could also result from distress of other banks, which raise rates during distress to attract
deposits (Acharya and Mora, 2015). I consider banks having a deposit rate advantage
as the percentage of branch-products in which the bank offers deposit rates lower than
the median rate for that product in an MSA. Higher the percentage, greater the banks’
deposit rate advantage. I find that rates of deposit inflows (outflows) are lower (higher)
at banks that have a deposit rate advantage, corroborating DeAngelo and Stulz (2015).
The findings are qualitatively similar for core deposits and large time-deposits. However,
deposits are reallocated from banks that offer lower deposit rates to those with higher
deposit rates. This finding is more in line with Egan, Hortaçsu, et al. (2017) who suggest
that distressed banks have lower demand for uninsured funds and hence suggestively lower
rates, and with Ben-David et al. (2017) who suggest that deposit rates are associated with
demand for funds and thus banks raise rates to attract funds.
I next look at the (dis)utility to depositors resulting from banks’ probability of default.
In their calibrated model Egan, Hortaçsu, et al. (2017) find that a 1% increase in the risk-
neutral probability of default leads to a 12% decrease in the market share of uninsured
deposits for a bank, while there is no such effect on insured deposits. They attribute this
to both a lowered demand for uninsured deposits and a drop in the supply. I measure
4They use the term "liquidity premium", but the essence is the same.
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a banks’ insolvency risk as the ratio of non-performing assets (NPA’s) to total loans,
and the ratio of Charge-Offs to NPA’s. The first measure gives an estimate of a banks’
probability of default (PD), while the second measure is an estimate of the banks’ loss-
given-default (LGD). I find that the rate of deposit inflows is roughly 43% lower, and
the rate of deposit outflows is nearly 77% higher at banks with a high insolvency risk.
However, the disparity in deposit inflows is more prominent in large time-deposits, while
the disparity in outflows is more visible in core deposits. This is contrary to expectations
that uninsured depositors would be the first to leave a distressed bank. Deposits are
reallocated from banks with a high probability of default to those with a low probability
of default, suggesting some market discipline. However, it is important to note that even
at banks with a higher probability of default there are simultaneous inflows and outflows
of deposits.
Lastly I look at the role of equity capital in deposit flows. Equity capital has been
studied as both in mitigating a banks’ risk of failure (Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993);
Repullo (2004); and Von Thadden (2004)), or diminish a banks’ ability to create liquidity
by affecting the banks’ incentives to monitor its borrowers (Diamond and Rajan (2000);
and Diamond and Rajan (2001)). I focus on the latter since in my setup depositors derive
utility from the banks’ management in actively monitoring its borrowers and generating
returns sufficient enough to repay the depositors. I find that the rates of deposit inflows
are 34% higher at banks with high capital levels, while rates of deposit outflows are nearly
76% higher. Deposits however are reallocated from banks with high capital to banks
with low capital, suggesting a reallocation towards banks that are better at producing
liquidity. Again, it is worthwhile to note that even at banks with low capital levels, there
are simultaneous inflows and outflows of deposits.
My findings suggest that merely focusing on deposit outflows at distressed banks may
not reveal a complete picture of how deposit flows affect bank stability. I extend case-
studies on individual banks to the aggregate level and show that there are simultaneous
inflows and outflows of deposits across bank and deposit types, and rates of inflows and
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outflows vary across deposit types, and deposits flows across banks. My study provides
evidence on the stability of various account types based on economic and market con-
ditions, bank size, and the utility that depositors generate. My study has important
implications for future research in the design of regulations related to banking system
liquidity and stable funding.
1.2 Background and Related Literature
Deposit flows and banking stability have traditionally been studied under theoretical mod-
els of bank runs. Seminal work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) suggests the mechanism
through which deposit flows affect the (in)stability of banks. Works such as Postlewaite
and Vives (1987), Peck and Shell (2003), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), and Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2015) have further examined bank-runs as an equilibrium response by depos-
itors to bank health. On the other hand, Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Jacklin and
Bhattacharya (1988), and Uhlig (2010) model bank-runs as purely information based
response by depositors.
Empirically, Gorton (1988), Saunders and Wilson (1996), and Calomiris and Mason
(1997) find that bank-runs are related to the banks’ fundamentals, while Calomiris and
Mason (1997) find that in addition to bank fundamentals, panic amongst depositors also
plays a role. In addition to bank-runs, deposit withdrawals have also been studied as
a market disciplining mechanism. Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) examine the
banking crises in Latin America and find that depositors withdraw their deposits as
means of disciplining the banks. Park and Peristiani (1998) find that in addition to
deposit withdrawals, depositors also demand higher rates on deposits from distressed
banks, as a disciplining mechanism.
These studies have largely considered depositors as a homogeneous group and focused
on deposit outflows at failing/distressed banks. More recent case studies have found
evidence that depositors are in-fact heterogeneous in nature, and respond differently to a
banks’ solvency risk. While some depositors leave the bank immediately at the slightest
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hint of insolvency, others are more patient. Depositor-bank relationships and deposit
insurance plays an important role in depositors’ response to perceived insolvency risk.
Recent empirical evidence has also shown that even at failing banks there are simultaneous
inflows and outflows of deposits, contrary to what one might expect. Moreover, recent
theoretical models suggest that depositors can distinguish between healthy and distressed
banks, and provide empirical evidence that deposits are reallocated from distressed to
healthy banks.
To examine the heterogeneity in depositor behavior in response to perceived solvency
risk, Iyer, Puri, and Ryan (2016) use deposit account-level data and examine two bank-
runs on an Indian bank at different time periods. This bank was subject to a low level and
a high level solvency shock over two different time periods, years apart. They find that
depositors with loan relationships with the bank were less likely to run during the low
solvency shock, while uninsured depositors are more likely to run. In the high solvency
shock event, they find that depositors with longer relationships with the bank were less
likely to run, while those with frequent past transactions were more likely to run. These
findings suggest that considering depositors as a homogeneous group may not represent
a complete picture in understanding the effect of deposit flows on bank stability.
In another study Martin et al. (2018) use deposit account-level data at a failing Indian
bank and find that even at that failing bank there are simultaneous inflows and outflows
of deposits. They find that temporary deposit guarantee measures introduced at the
time of the financial crisis, and deposit insurance slows down the rate of deposit outflows.
Uninsured deposits are replaced by insured deposits even when the banks’ failure is public
knowledge. Moreover, the inflow of deposits is large in magnitude and has a first-order
impact. So, while prior literature has largely focused on deposit outflows in assessing
a banks’ stability, this new evidence suggests that we need to look at both inflows and
outflows in understanding bank stability.
To further emphasize the heterogeneity in depositor behavior to bank insolvency risk,
Egan, Hortaçsu, et al. (2017) suggest a model where insured and uninsured depositors
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choose between differentiated banks based on their individual utility. They suggest that
insured depositors are less sensitive to a banks’ probability of default as they derive
utility from banking services. Uninsured depositors on the other hand derive utility only
from the deposit rates offered and since they would lose their deposits in case of a bank
failure, are more sensitive to a banks’ probability of default. They also cite an example
where the market share of uninsured deposits for a distressed bank fell, while at the same
time the market share of uninsured deposits increased for a healthy bank. Results from
their calibrated model suggests that depositors can perceive solvency risk and move their
deposits from distressed to healthy banks.
In addition to individual bank health or the health of the banking system, the aggre-
gate demand for and supply of deposits is also affected by business cycles and market
conditions (Martin et al., 2018). High levels of economic activity and market returns
would lead to higher inflow of deposits into the banking system, suggesting wealth effects
(Bomberger, 1993). High market volatility on the other hand would also lead to an in-
crease in deposit inflows, since due to deposit insurance banks are viewed as “safe havens”
(Acharya and Naqvi, 2012). Allen et al. (2015) suggest a model where deposits flows into
banks depends on the other alternative storage technologies available to investors. They
suggest if investors can generate higher returns from these other technologies there would
be lower deposits available for banks and vice-versa.
Empirically, however Acharya and Mora (2015) and Helwege et al. (2017) find that
banks faced funding shortfalls during the financial crisis and were only able to create liq-
uidity due to support from the government and government-sponsored agencies. Pérignon
et al. (2018) on the other hand find there were no wholesale funding dry-ups during the
financial crisis. Additionally, Gatev and Strahan (2006) find that bank deposit flows
increased in periods of market-wide liquidity shocks prior to the crisis.
In addition to bank insolvency risk, economic and equity market conditions, theories
of bank capital suggest differences in leverage across banks based on individual bank
attributes. Since leverage is the net result of changes in inflows and outflows, deposit
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flows should vary with individual bank attributes. DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) suggest
that as a product of financial intermediation, banks produce a safe liquid claim, namely
deposits, banks should be able to charge a liquidity premium for this service. This is
similar in spirit to Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) and Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen (2013) who find a liquidity premium present in the prices of US Trea-
sury securities. For banks however, this liquidity premium is generated in the form of
deposit rate advantages. That is when a particular bank pays a lower rate of interest on
its deposits compared to other banks offering similar products in the same market. DeAn-
gelo and Stulz (2015) further suggest that higher the liquidity premium (or deposit rate
advantage) higher the franchise value of the bank, and consequently lower the leverage.
In addition to the rate of return earned on their deposits, deposit flows are also
affected by the demand for deposits at individual banks. Egan, Hortaçsu, et al. (2017)
suggest that the demand for uninsured deposits drops for a bank in financial distress,
while there is no prominent effect for insured deposits. This can be expected as insured
depositors derive utility from banking services, while uninsured depositors who could lose
all their funds in case of a bank failure, would be more sensitive to a banks’ insolvency
risk. However, both insured and uninsured depositors are sensitive to a banks’ probability
of default albeit to varying degrees as both lose some utility with bank failure. Egan,
Hortaçsu, et al. (2017) further suggest that depositors are fully rational, can anticipate a
banks’ probability of default and more their deposits from distressed to healthier banks.
So a banks’ probability of default would be expected to affect the deposit inflows and
outflows at that bank.
The returns a bank is able to generate for its depositors is dependent on the loan
premium the bank is able to generate through its lending activities. This loan premium
is a function of the banks’ information production on their borrowers (Diamond, 1984)
and (Campbel and Kracaw, 1980), by screening borrowers at loan origination (Stiglitz
and Weiss, 1981), and monitoring the borrower over the life of the loan (Berger and
Udell, 2002). Equity capital plays a critical role in this intermediation process. On the
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one hand equity capital can aid in generating a loan premium via the “risk absorption”
hypothesis. It can mitigate the risk of bank failure (Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993);
Repullo (2004); and Von Thadden (2004)). Equity can also diminish a banks’ ability
to generate a loan premium by affecting the banks’ incentives to monitor its borrowers
(Diamond and Rajan (2000); and Diamond and Rajan (2001)), or the “financial fragility
crowding-out” hypothesis. Through the “risk absorption” and “financial fragility crowding
out” hypothesis, equity capital can affect deposit inflows and outflows.
The “risk absorption” hypothesis considers equity capital to be a cushion against
unexpected losses, and correspondingly the greater the cushion, lower the insolvency
risk. Berger and Bouwman (2013) find that higher levels of equity capital help reduce a
banks’ insolvency risk especially during crises when the risk of insolvency is higher. They
also find that higher capital levels aids a bank in increasing its market share thereby
contributing to liquidity creation. Allen et al. (2015) and Mehran and Thakor (2011)
provide theoretical foundations on how higher levels of equity capital help a bank expand
its market share. Empirically, Calomiris and Mason (2003) find that banks with higher
levels of equity capital are better able to compete for deposits and loans, that is produce
liquidity. Conversely, Koehn and Santomero (1980) find that increases in regulatory cap-
ital actually increases the banks’ portfolio risk and consequently increasing its insolvency
risk.
On the other hand, the “financial fragility crowding-out” hypothesis considers equity
to be an impediment to liquidity creation. (Diamond and Rajan, 2000) argue that higher
equity capital makes the banks less fragile, thereby reducing the banks’ incentives to
monitor its borrower and affects its lending activity, and consequently affecting its ability
to produce liquidity. Aiyar et al. (2012) study the UK market and find that regulated
banks decrease lending in response to tighter capital requirements, while the effect is
opposite for unregulated banks. Conversely, Jiménez et al. (2017) study the Spanish
market and find that increases in capital buffers increases liquidity production by banks,
and subsequently employment by firms and the banks’ survival probability.
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1.3 Data and Methodology
Data on deposits is obtained from the Reports of Condition and Income (“Call Reports”)
filed by banks with their respective supervisory agencies every quarter. Call Reports can
be obtained from the Chicago Federal Reserve website in machine readable form.5 I focus
on Total Deposits, Core Deposits, and Large Time-Deposits. For Core Deposits I use
the Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR) definition (Council, 2006) where Core
Deposits include total transaction deposits, savings deposits, and small time deposits.
Large time-deposits are defined as time deposits ≥ $100,000 prior to Q1,2010 and time
deposits ≥ $250,000 since. My sample period for data on deposits runs from Q1,1984 -
Q4,2017.
Data on deposit products, deposit rates, bank branches, and the MSA of those
branches is obtained from RateWatch. RateWatch provides weekly branch level deposit
rates for all US commercial banks for a wide range of deposit account types. Data from
RateWatch is available from January 1997 onwards. Weekly deposit rates across branches
are aggregated to the branch level each quarter to arrive at average deposit rates for each
bank-branch, quarter, and deposit product type.
Data on economic indicators, such as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Federal
Funds Rate, Coincident Economic Activity Index (CEA), and the Leading Index was ob-
tained from the Federal Reserve Economic Date (FRED) made available by the St. Louis
Federal Reserve. The Coincident Economic Activity Index measures the employment and
payroll activities, while the leading index predicts the aggregate 6-month growth rate for
the CEA Index.
Aggregate Measures
To compute deposit flow rates, measures of persistence, and index of inter-group flows
I use the methodology developed by (Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), and Davis, Halti-
wanger, Schuh, et al. (1998)), and used to compute credit reallocation rates in (Herrera et
5https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/commercial-bank-data
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al., 2011), and gross credit flow rates in (Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi, 2005). Computation
of aggregate deposit flow rates and other measures of deposit reallocation is described in
the following sections.
Aggregate Flow Rates
The average deposits at a bank i between time t− 1 and t is defined as dit. For a set of
n banks in the market, Dit is defined as the average of the total deposits of all banks.
Deposit growth rate git for bank i at time t is defined as the ratio of the first difference
between two time periods, divided by dit. That is,







git = (Depositsi,t −Depositsi,t−1)/dit
By construction, the growth measure git is bounded between [−2, 2]. For de-novo banks
(entries) git = 2, while for failed/merged banks (exits )git = −2, for the quarter of entry
or exit. In addition to being a bounded measure of growth, it incorporates a continuum
of entries and exits in the banking system. This is especially important for the banking
industry which has undergone substantial consolidation during the given time period.
Aggregate deposit inflow rates (POSt) are computed as the weighted average of the
growth rates of banks with positive growth rates, while aggregate deposit outflow rates
(NEGt) are computed as the weighted average of the absolute values of growth rates for

















Aggregate deposit reallocation rate is the sum of deposit inflow rate and deposit outflow
rate (SUMt = POSt+NEGt), and net inflow rate is the difference between deposit inflow
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rate and deposit outflow rate (NETt = POSt − NEGt). Excess deposit reallocation is
the difference between aggregate reallocation rate and the absolute values of net inflow
rate (EXCt = AGGt − |NETt|). EXCt is the deposit reallocation amongst banks in
excess of the minimum required to accommodate changes in deposits.
Persistence
The substantial rates (and dollar amounts) of deposit inflows and outflows each quarter
raises the question whether these patterns are transitory, or are an integral part of the
banking industry and intrinsic to the reallocation of deposits. To quantify the degree to
which these changes are transitory or permanent I compute measures of persistence in
deposit flows based on (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992). The persistence measure for bank









A persistence measure of Pit = 1 indicates that all the new deposits that came into the
bank at time t will stay with the bank for one more quarter, while a persistence measure of
Pit = 0 indicates that these deposit inflows are temporary and will not last one additional
quarter. The overall quarterly persistence measure for the industry is computed as the








Inter-Group Reallocation of Deposits
Previously we have seen that there is an excess reallocation of deposits across banks. To
explore whether this inter-bank reallocation of deposits is within banks in similar size
groups or across banks of different sizes, I compute an index of inter-group reallocation
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where j=1,...,J denotes the groups. If all groups have only inflows or outflows of deposits
then SUMjt = |NETjt| and the index will have a value of 0. An index value of Wt = 0
suggests that all deposit flows are inter-group. Conversely, if all deposit flows are only
intra-group that would imply |NETjt| = 0 and the index value would be 1. An index
value of Wt = 1 indicates that all the deposit flows are intra-group. 0 ≤ Wt ≤ 1 measures
the degree of deposit flows across groups. For example 0 ≤ Wt < 0.5 would indicate that
a large fraction of the deposit flows are inter-group, while 0.5 ≤ Wt < 1 would indicate
that deposit flows are predominantly intra-group.
Direction of Reallocation of Deposits
The measures for inter-group reallocation of deposits gives an idea about the degree
of reallocation, but does not tell us anything about the direction of reallocation. To
ascertain the direction of deposit flows I construct a directionality measure that builds
on the methodology developed by (Meller and Metiu, 2017) to measure synchronization
of economic cycles across countries. My directionality measure is constructed using a
two-step procedure. In the first step, dummy variables are created for each individual
banks’ deposit growth rate git, where
Growth Dummyit (Git) =

1 if git > 0
0 if git ≤ 0
Each quarter banks are classified “Large” or “Small” based on total assets. Banks in the
top 1% in total assets are classified as large, the remaining are classified as small.
In the second step, I create a N*M matrix where N is the number of large banks
and M the number of small banks. Each element in the matrix is assigned a value of
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+1, 0, or−1 as follows, where the subscripts L stands large banks, and S for small banks.
Matrixij,t =

+1 if Git,L = 1 & Gjt,S = 0
0 if Git,L = 1 & Gjt,S = 1, or Git,L = 0 & Gjt,S = 0
−1 if Git,L = 0 & Gjt,S = 1
That is, each quarter deposit growth rate dummy or all large banks are compared to the
deposit growth rate dummy of all small banks. If deposit growth rate at a large bank is
positive while that at a small bank is negative the corresponding element matrix element
is given a value of +1, if it is the other way round, it is given a value of −1. If growth
rates at both the large and small banks are both positive or both negative, then a value
of 0 is ascribed. Using this methodology, I can safely assume that each element of the
matrix has a discrete uniform distribution, or Matrixij,t ∼ U [−1, 1].
The directionality measure for time t is computed as the average value of all elements





(M∗N) . If the direction of deposit flows is truly
random, then the value of the my measure is zero (E[µt] = 0). This measure takes a
value of 1 if all small banks had a negative deposit growth rate and all large banks had
a positive deposit growth rate, suggesting that deposits were reallocated from the small
banks to large banks. A value of −1 would mean deposits were reallocated from large
banks to small banks, and a value of 0 would imply that the direction of reallocation is
inconclusive.
When examining the direction of deposit flows between the largest and the smaller
banks, I split my analysis on time periods prior to and after Reigle-Neal and GLB since
the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (Riegle-Neal)
allowed banks to operate across state boundaries and hence promoted “economies of scale”
in the banking industry, while the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA) allowed banks and
financial institutions to offer investment banking and insurance services, thereby promot-
ing “economies of scope”. It is possible that the enhanced scale and scope economies
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available to large banks contributed to the reallocation of deposits from small to large
banks.
Deposit Rate Advantages
I compute a banks’ ability to enjoy deposit rate advantage as the number of branch-
products in which the bank has a deposit rate lower than the median rate in the MSA
where the branch is located. Let a bank i have n = 1, ..., N branches and offers k =
1, ..., K products per branch, and j = 1, ...., J be the MSA’s in which the bank operates
a branch. Then Ri,k,n,j is the deposit rate on kth product, in branch n in MSA j for
bank i. And, R̄k,j be the median MSA rate for the kth product. Then the percentage of




j=1 1(Ri,k,n,j ≤ R̄k,j)
N ∗K
1 is an indicator variable that takes value of 1 if the condition is met, else takes the value
0.
1.4 Results
Empirically, the effect of deposit flows on banking stability have largely been studied as
the outflows of deposits in response to fundamental weakness at banks (Gorton (1988),
Saunders and Wilson (1996), and Calomiris and Mason (1997)) or as a panic based run
by depositors (Calomiris and Mason, 1997). Recent empirical evidence has suggested
that in addition to deposit outflows, there are simultaneous inflows at failing/distressed
banks (Martin et al., 2018). There is heterogeneity in depositor response to perceived
insolvency risk of individual banks (Iyer, Puri, and Ryan, 2016). And depositors are
rational and move their deposits from distressed to healthy banks (Egan, Hortaçsu, et
al., 2017). In this section we look at some of the properties of deposit inflows, outflows,
and deposit reallocation. Then I show how examining gross deposit flows provides us with
valuable information on the stability of the banking system, which cannot he garnered
from studying net deposit flows alone.
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Magnitude and Persistence
Table 1 shows the rates and dollar amounts of aggregate inflows, outflows, and reallocation
of deposits within the banking system for the 1984 - 2017 time period. The figures are
based on quarterly changes in deposits at the bank-level and all dollar amounts are in
December 2017 dollars. I find that the average rate of deposit inflows (POSD) is 3.7% (or
$238 bn), and ranges from 1.2% - 10.3% (or $83bn - $932bn) each quarter over the sample
period. Conversely, the rate of deposit outflows (NEGD) averages 1.1% (or $71bn), and
ranges from 0.2% - 3.7% (or $12bn - $389bn) each quarter. I find that on average, deposit
inflows are nearly five times as large and five times as volatile than deposit outflows.
I find a similar trend across deposit types, though the magnitude varies considerably.
Core deposits have an average inflow rate of 3.9% and an outflows rate of 1%, but on
average deposit inflows are nearly six times as large as deposit outflows. Large time-
deposits have an average inflow rate of 7.3% and an outflows rate of 5.2%, an on average
deposits inflows are only twice as large as deposit inflows. In dollar terms however,
inflows of core deposits are much higher ($216bn) compared to inflows of large time-
deposits ($123bn), each quarter, while outflows of core deposits ($55bn) are comparable
in magnitude to outflows of large time-deposits ($50bn), attesting to the “sticky” nature
of core deposits. These aggregate level deposit outflows (run-off) rates are much lower
than those considered in the Basel III regulations on liquidity and stable funding (Basel
III, 2013). Basel III regulations assume a run-off rate of 5% (minimum of 3%) for stable
funding sources, which in my case are core deposits, and a run-off rate of 10% or higher for
less stable funding sources, or in my case large time-deposits. These findings suggest that
the deposit run-off rates considered in the Basel regulations may be more conservative
than the run-of rates observed.
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Table 1. Gross Deposit Inflows, Outflows, and Reallocation
Measure N Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Total Deposits Core Deposits Large Time-Deposits
Inflows (POSD) 135 0.037 0.017 0.012 0.103 0.039 0.026 0.011 0.245 0.073 0.029 0.019 0.158
Outflows (NEGD) 135 0.011 0.007 0.002 0.037 0.010 0.007 0.002 0.033 0.052 0.020 0.018 0.115
Reallocation (EXCD) 135 0.021 0.011 0.005 0.054 0.020 0.011 0.004 0.050 0.091 0.028 0.035 0.160
Entry 135 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.062 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.060 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.078
Exit 135 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.083 0.00003 0.0001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.020 0.000 0.237
Inflows / Outflows 135 4.820 4.457 0.509 36.026 6.230 8.772 0.537 87.010 1.653 1.064 0.234 5.707
Reallocation / Outflows 135 1.972 0.132 1.017 2.000 1.979 0.118 1.073 2.000 1.808 0.364 0.467 2.000
In 2017 Dollars ($ Billions)
Inflows (POSD) 135 237.74 124.96 83.84 932.80 216.42 123.72 50.11 836.41 70.63 34.36 17.82 215.96
Outflows (NEGD) 135 71.00 46.14 12.00 389.25 55.10 31.45 7.56 157.89 50.39 24.36 18.57 207.44
Reallocation (EXCD) 135 136.62 75.31 24.00 487.71 108.00 60.25 15.13 315.77 85.57 27.80 35.64 182.99
Note: Table 1 shows the rates and dollar amounts of deposit inflows (POSD), outflows (NEGD), aggregate flows (SUMD), net flows
(NETD), and excess reallocation (EXCD) in the banking system for the 1984 - 2017 sample period. All figures in the table are based on
quarterly changes in bank-level deposits. The central fact captured by the table is that the rate of deposit inflows (3.7%) is larger than
the rate of deposit outflows (1.1%). However, deposit inflows are more volatile than deposit outflows. The rate of inflows and outflows
for core deposits (3.9%, and 1%) is smaller than the corresponding rates for large time-deposits (7.3%, and 5.2%), although the inflows
and outflows of large time-deposits are more volatile. I also see that in addition to the simultaneous inflows and outflows, there is an
excess reallocation of deposits in the banking system. Excess reallocation is the change in total deposits, in excess of the net deposit
flows. Excess reallocation ranges from 0.5% - 5.4% ($24bn - $487bn) for the sample period. Additionally, we see that entries (de-novo























































Figure 1. Simultaneous Inflows and Outflows of Deposits
Note: Figure 1 shows the rates of simultaneous inflows, outflows, and net inflows for
total, core, and large time-deposits. We see that in all quarters during the sample there
are simultaneous deposit inflows and outflows in the banking system. It can also be seen
that during the most recent financial crisis, only large time-deposits had periods of net
outflows, while there was a net inflow of core and total deposits during the same time
period. However, there was a large outflow of core deposits liquidity during the 2000 -
2001 financial crisis.
Figure 1 further elaborates on the simultaneous inflows and outflows of deposits. We
see that every quarter there are both deposit inflows and outflows, irrespective of whether
the net inflows are positive or negative. Specifically, in periods of negative net deposit
flows i.e. when the blue bars are below the 0 level line, there are deposit inflows, and in
periods of net positive deposit flows, there are deposit outflows. Additionally, we see that
during the most recent financial crisis (2007 - 2009) only large time-deposits experienced
net outflows, while during the previous crisis (2000 - 2001) core deposits experienced net
outflows. There are also simultaneous inflows and outflows even in periods of net deposit
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outflows. Martin et al. (2018) document a similar behavior using account-level data, and








































Deposit Outflows and Exits
Figure 2. Inflows, Outflows, Entry and Exit
Note: Figure 2 shows the aggregate rates of deposit inflows and outflows, and the rates of
inflows and outflows as a result of entries (de-novo banks) and exits (failures or mergers).
I find that while there has been substantial consolidation in the industry (see Figure B
as a result of mergers and bank failures, entries and exits by themselves have little effect
on the rates of deposit inflows and outflows. The spike in deposit inflows as a result of
entries in 2010-2011, was primarily due to thrifts’ change of charter to commercial banks.
The spike in outflows seen in 1985-1986 was a result of many bank failures during the
Savings & Loan crisis during that time period.
These findings suggest that not only should deposit inflows be considered in evalu-
ating the stability of the banking system, considering heterogeneity in deposit types is
also important. I would also like to mention here that while the banking industry has
consolidated over time (see Figure B in the Appendix), I find that the entry and exit
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of banks into and from the system, by itself has little impact on deposit inflows and
outflows, respectively. The effect of bank entries and exits on the magnitude of deposit
flows is shown in Table 1 and further elaborated in Figure 2.
To assess whether these deposit flows are due to temporary shocks to individual banks,
or are structural to the banking industry, I compute measures of persistence in deposit
flows. We find that deposit inflows and outflows are highly persistent. Figure 3 shows the
plots of average persistence measure across time periods, and Table 2 shows the average




















Persistence in Deposit Flows
Figure 3. Persistence in Deposit Flows
Note: Figure 3 shows the persistence in deposit flows at banks across time periods. Ver-
tical gray bars are NBER recession periods and the horizontal line is the 50% persistence
level. A persistence level of 1 indicates that all deposits that came into a bank remain for
one more quarter, while a persistence level of 0 indicates that none of the deposits that
came into a bank remained for another quarter. I see that for most part of the sample
period the persistence measure is above 0.5, indicating that on average only 50% of the
deposits that come into a bank stay for another quarter.
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We find that on average the persistence measure for the entire sample period is 0.61
(range 0.53 - 0.68) for total deposits, 0.57 (range 0.30 - 0.69) for core deposits, and 0.51
(range 0.42 - 0.60) for large time-deposits. This indicates that roughly only 50% - 60% of
new deposits stay with the bank for an additional quarter, while the remaining deposits
either leave the banking system or are redistributed amongst the banks. This further
suggests that both deposit inflows and outflows are innate to the each bank and hence
both should be considered in designing regulations on liquidity and stable funding.
Table 2. Persistence Measures - Summary Statistics
Total Deposits Core Deposits Large Time-Deposits
Mean 0.501 0.486 0.497
St. Dev. 0.028 0.029 0.042
Min 0.412 0.395 0.405
Max 0.574 0.576 0.560
Note: Table 2 shows that roughly only 50% of deposits that enter a bank remain at the
bank for one more quarter, while the rest either leave the banking system or are reallo-
cated amongst other banks. This further indicates that there is substantial reallocation
of deposits in the banking system.
In addition to deposit inflows and outflows into the banking system, there is also a
reallocation amongst banks. This reallocation (EXCD) of deposits within the banking
system which averages around 2.1% (or $136bn), and ranges from 0.5% - 5.4% (or $24bn
- $487bn) each quarter. The reallocation rate for core deposits is around 2%, while the
reallocation rate for large time-deposits is much higher at around 9.1%. However, the
average ratio of reallocation to outflows is around 1.8-1.9 across deposit types. This ratio
suggests that for every $1 that leaves the banking system, $1.9 is reallocated amongst
banks. Reallocation suggests that depositors are rational, and while some depositors may
withdraw their depositors from the banking system completely, nearly twice choose to
move their deposits to other banks which provide them with a greater utility.
Contemporaneous and Cross-Correlations
Martin et al. (2018) find that when uninsured depositors leave a failing bank they also
with their insured deposits that the banks. They also find that at the failing bank they
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study outflow of uninsured deposits was accompanied with an inflow of insured deposits,
albeit from different depositors via internet listing services. To further examine whether
such patterns are unique only to failing banks or a common occurrence in the banking
system, I examine contemporaneous and cross-correlations between deposit inflow and
outflows, across deposit types. I first examine the correlations in deposit inflows and
outflows at the aggregate level.
Table 3. Correlations - Core Deposits and Large Time-Deposits
POSCORE NEGCORE POSLTD NEGLTD
POSCORE 1
NEGCORE -0.24** 1
POSLTD 0.26** 0.23** 1
NEGLTD 0.11 0.14 -0.16 1
Note: Table 3 shows the correlations between deposit inflows and outflows for core de-
posits and large time-deposits. From the table we see that outflows of core deposits are
associated with lower inflows of core deposits. However, the outflows of core deposits
are also associated with inflows of large time-deposits, suggesting a substitution effect in
funding sources. We also see that inflows of core and large time-deposits are also also
positively correlated with each other, but outflows are not significantly correlated. This
suggests that while there is a run-in of different types of depositors simultaneously, the
run-offs don’t happen simultaneously.
Table 3 shows the correlations between deposit inflows and outflows for core deposits
and large time-deposits. From the table we see that outflows of core deposits are as-
sociated with lower inflows of core deposits (ρ(POSCore, NEGCore) = −0.24∗∗), or an
inflow of core deposits leads to a lower outflow of core deposits.Outflows of core deposits
are also associated with inflows of large time-deposits ((ρ(NEGCore, POSLTD) = 0.23∗∗),
suggesting some degree of substitution in funding sources. I however do not find any
evidence that outflows of large time-deposits are associated with inflows of core deposits
((ρ(NEGLTD, POSCore) = 0.11). We also see that inflows of core and large time-deposits
are also also positively correlated with each other ((ρ(POSCore, POSLTD) = 0.26∗∗), but
outflows are not significantly correlated ((ρ(NEGCore, NEGLTD) = 0.14). This suggests
that while there is a run-in of different types of depositors simultaneously, the run-offs
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don’t happen simultaneously, which is essential in understanding depositor run-offs and
bank stability.
I then examine the correlations between deposit inflows and outflows by various levels
of insolvency risk, across deposit types. I use levels of equity capital, Non-Performing
Assets (NPA’s) and Charge-Offs (CO’s) to identify insolvency risk.
Table 4. Correlations - By Insolvency Risk
ρ(POSCORE ,POSLTD) ρ(POSCORE ,NEGLTD) ρ(NEGCORE ,POSLTD) ρ(NEGCORE ,NEGLTD)
High Capital 0.89∗∗∗ −0.07 −0.09 0.22∗∗∗
Low Capital 0.23∗∗∗ −0.07 0.19∗∗ 0.19∗∗
High NPA 0.59∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗ −0.15∗ 0.01
Low NPA 0.42∗∗∗ −0.01 0.04 −0.03
High CO 0.33∗∗∗ 0.04 0.01 0.14∗
Low CO 0.33∗∗∗ 0.14∗ 0.14 0.03
Note: Table 4 shows the correlations between deposit inflows and outflows for core
deposits and large time-deposits, by various levels of insolvency risk. NPA is Non-
Performing Assets / Total Loans, and CO is Charge-Offs/Non-Performing Assets. We
see that while inflows of core and large time-deposits are positively correlated across risk
categories, simultaneous outflows are indifferent to capital levels, but are most likely in
banks with high Charge-Offs. We also see that the substitution effect between core de-
posits and large time deposits is most evident in banks with low capital, high levels of
NPA’s, and low Charge-Offs.
Table 4 shows that while inflows of core and large time-deposits are positively cor-
related across risk categories, simultaneous outflows are indifferent to capital levels, but
are more likely in banks with high Charge-Offs. We also see that the substitution effect
between core deposits and large time deposits is most evident in banks with low capital,
high levels of NPA’s, and low Charge-Offs. These findings suggest that the substitution
effect between core deposits and large time-deposits is largely prominent at banks facing
greater insolvency risk, similar to the findings by Martin et al. (2018).
I also examine non-contemporaneous or cross-correlations between deposit inflows
and outflows, across deposit types. From Figure 4 we see that core deposit inflows are
positively correlated with large time-deposit inflows, both contemporaneously and with
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future inflows.






































































Figure 4. Cross-Correlation - Core Deposits and Large Time-Deposits
Note: Figure 4 shows the cross correlation plots between deposit inflows/outflows for
core deposits and large time-deposits. We see that core deposit inflows are positively
correlated with large time-deposit inflows, both contemporaneously and with future in-
flows. Deposit outflows for core deposits and large time-deposits are also correlated with
each other but non-contemporaneously, suggesting that both core deposits and large
time-deposits don’t necessarily the leave the banking system at the same time. The
cross-correlations between inflows/outflows of core and large time-deposits suggest the
presence of a substitution effect between core deposits and large time-deposits, albeit
non-contemporaneously. Outflows of large time-deposits are followed by inflows of core
deposits after a period of 5 quarters. Inflows of large time-deposits affect the outflows of
core deposits both with a lead and lag.
Deposit outflows for core deposits and large time-deposits are also correlated with
each other but non-contemporaneously, suggesting that both core deposits and large
time-deposits don’t necessarily the leave the banking system at the same time. The
cross-correlations between inflows/outflows of core and large time-deposits suggest the
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presence of a substitution effect between core deposits and large time-deposits, albeit
non-contemporaneously. Outflows of large time-deposits are followed by inflows of core
deposits after a period of 5 quarters. Inflows of large time-deposits affect the outflows of
core deposits both with a lead and a lag.
Economic and Market Conditions
I next examine the effect of macroeconomic and market conditions on deposit flows. Table
5 shows the effect of economic and market conditions on deposit flows. I find that the
aggregate rate of deposit inflows increases during periods of high stock market returns,
and the rate of deposit outflows decreases during periods of high economic activity. Across
deposit types, I find that the increase in the inflow of deposits is primarily due increases
in core deposits inflows. These findings suggest the presence of a wealth effect, where high
economic activity is accompanied by increased lending by banks, and thus an increase in
the demand for funds. Martin et al. (2018) find a similar result in their study.
On the other hand, the rate of inflows of large time-deposits increases during periods
of high market volatility, suggesting that depositors view banks as “safe havens” during
periods of market uncertainty. These findings are consistent with (Acharya and Naqvi,
2012) and (Gatev and Strahan, 2006),and could potentially be attributed to the liquidity
and safety of bank deposits during economic contractions. So while investors can choose
bank deposits as means to earn higher returns vis-a-vis other storage technologies (Allen
et al., 2015), bank deposits may be viewed as a safe storage mechanism rather than
investments, especially during periods of economic uncertainty.
High economic activity also affects core deposits and large time-deposits differently.
For core deposits, while both the rate of deposit inflows and outflows decrease, for large
time-deposits only the rate of outflows decreases. Large time-deposits are also more
sensitive to changes in the benchmark rate of return (the federal funds rate), compared
to core deposits. While Egan, Hortaçsu, et al. (2017) suggest that all deposits are price
inelastic, I find that increases in the federal funds rate leads to higher inflows and lower
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Table 5. Deposit Flows - Macro Variables
Total Deposits Core Deposits Large Time-Deposits
POSD NEGD POSD NEGD POSD NEGD
GDP Growth Rate −0.0003 0.001∗ −0.0005 0.0004 0.001 0.0005
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.001)
Fed Funds Rate 0.0004 −0.0005 −0.001 −0.0001 0.006∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.002) (0.001)
CEA Index −0.0002 −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0003∗∗ −0.0001∗∗ −0.0001 −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.00005) (0.0002) (0.00005) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Lead Index −0.005 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.002∗ 0.001 −0.007∗∗
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005) (0.003)
VIX Change 0.011 0.002 0.008 0.004 0.032∗∗∗ −0.010
(0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.012) (0.007)
S&P 500 Returns 0.062∗ −0.003 0.075∗∗ −0.001 0.056 0.006
(0.035) (0.011) (0.036) (0.011) (0.054) (0.034)
Constant 0.058∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.005) (0.017) (0.005) (0.025) (0.016)
Observations 111 111 111 111 111 111
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.207 0.071 0.113 0.280 0.389
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Table 5 shows the effect of macro-economic and market conditions on deposit
inflows and outflows, across deposit types. I find that the aggregate rate of deposit
inflows increases during periods of high stock market returns, and the rate of deposit
outflows decreases during periods of high economic activity. Across deposit types, I find
that the rate of inflows of core deposits increases during periods of high stock returns,
suggesting a wealth effect. On the other hand, the rate of inflows of large time-deposits
increases during periods of high market volatility, suggesting that depositors view banks
as “safe havens” during periods of market uncertainty. High economic activity also affects
core deposits and large time-deposits differently. For core deposits, while both the rate
of deposit inflows and outflows decrease, for large time-deposits only the rate of outflows
decreases. Large time-deposits are also more sensitive to changes in the benchmark rate of
return (the federal funds rate), compared to core deposits. Increases in the federal funds
rate leads to higher inflows and lower inflows for large time-deposits, while there is no
such effect observed for core deposits. These findings further elaborate on the sensitivity
of different deposit types to changes in macro economic and market conditions, and
benchmark rates of return.
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inflows for large time-deposits, while there is no such effect observed for core deposits.
These findings further elaborate on the sensitivity of different deposit types to changes in
macro economic and market conditions, which should be taken into consideration when
evaluation deposit flows and bank stability.
Cross-Sectional Variation
We have seen that the magnitude and volatility of aggregate deposit inflows and outflows
differs substantially. Deposit flows is a persistent feature for all banks, and flows vary
with economic and market conditions. I now explore the variation in deposit flows, the
magnitude of inter-group deposit flows, and the direction of deposit flows across bank
size groups.
Table 6 shows the rates of deposit inflows, outflows, and the reallocation of deposits
across bank size groups. Banks as classified into size groups each quarter based on total
assets and deposit flow measures are computed as percentage of total group deposits.6 We
see that the very largest banks (total assets in the top 1 percentile) have higher rates of
deposit inflows (4.2%) compared to inflow rates of 3.0% - 3.9% in the other groups. The
largest banks also have a comparable-to-lower rate of deposit outflows (1.2%) compared
to the 1.1%-2.6% rate of outflows for other groups. The these findings are similar for
both core and large time-deposits.
The ratio of deposit inflows to outflows decreases monotonically from the largest to the
smallest bank. For every $1 of outflows, the largest banks attract $9, while the smallest
banks only attract roughly $2.6. On the other hand the the ratio of deposit reallocation
to outflows increases monotonically from the largest to the smallest bank. Similarly for
every $1 in outflow of core deposits and large time-deposits, the largest bank attract
$11.8 and $1.9 respectively. On the other hand, for every $1 in outflow of core and large
time deposits, the smallest bank attract only $2.5 and $1.6, respectively. For every $1 of
outflow for the largest banks, $1.89 are reallocated amongst the largest banks, while for
6My findings are similar if instead of computing rates as percentage of total group deposits I use
aggregate deposits in the banking system.
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Table 6. Deposit Flows - By Bank Size
Measure N Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Total Deposits Core Deposits Large Time-Deposits
Largest Banks (Top 1 Percentile, Mean Size=$83.1bn, Median Size=$28.5bn)
Inflows (POSD) 135 0.042 0.029 0.046 0.037 0.076 0.042
Outflows (NEGD) 135 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.018 0.057 0.031
Reallocation (EXCD) 135 0.021 0.016 0.018 0.015 0.085 0.033
Inflows / Outflows 135 9.093 15.201 11.842 19.647 1.930 1.857
Reallocation / Outflows 135 1.892 0.311 1.902 0.323 1.686 0.510
Large Banks (1st% - 10th%’tile, Mean Size=$2.71bn, Median Size=$1.47bn)
Inflows (POSD) 135 0.039 0.016 0.044 0.028 0.076 0.032
Outflows (NEGD) 135 0.026 0.022 0.014 0.016 0.054 0.037
Reallocation (EXCD) 135 0.025 0.014 0.023 0.012 0.095 0.038
Inflows / Outflows 135 4.460 4.826 5.987 12.577 1.739 1.146
Reallocation / Outflows 135 1.979 0.132 1.972 0.183 1.897 0.272
Average Sized Banks (10th% - 25th%’tile, Mean Size=$430mn, Median Size=$394mn)
Inflows (POSD) 135 0.032 0.011 0.035 0.021 0.064 0.024
Outflows (NEGD) 135 0.011 0.004 0.015 0.025 0.043 0.020
Reallocation (EXCD) 135 0.021 0.008 0.022 0.008 0.077 0.020
Inflows / Outflows 135 3.507 2.253 4.244 10.609 1.745 0.970
Reallocation / Outflows 135 1.989 0.068 1.976 0.181 1.889 0.261
Median Banks (25th% - 50th%’tile, Mean Size=$181mn, Median Size=$166mn)
Inflows (POSD) 135 0.030 0.010 0.033 0.019 0.063 0.023
Outflows (NEGD) 135 0.011 0.004 0.016 0.030 0.043 0.022
Reallocation (EXCD) 135 0.022 0.006 0.024 0.008 0.078 0.030
Inflows / Outflows 135 3.083 1.919 3.461 7.989 1.666 0.863
Reallocation / Outflows 135 1.976 0.118 1.950 0.229 1.890 0.261
Small Banks (< 50th%’tile, Mean Size=$61mn, Median Size=$55mn)
Inflows (POSD) 135 0.033 0.012 0.035 0.019 0.072 0.028
Outflows (NEGD) 135 0.014 0.004 0.019 0.030 0.050 0.022
Reallocation (EXCD) 135 0.028 0.007 0.030 0.008 0.095 0.038
Inflows / Outflows 135 2.646 1.759 2.587 2.841 1.589 0.755
Reallocation / Outflows 135 1.969 0.138 1.920 0.247 1.924 0.187
Note: Table 6 shows the deposit flow measures for total, core, and large time-deposits
across banks of different size groups. I see that the largest banks have higher rates of
gross and net deposit inflows compared to other groups, while the other groups have
higher rates of excess deposit reallocation, and this effect is consistent across deposit
types. We also see that there is substantial excess reallocation of deposits across bank
size groups. So while as a group the largest banks may be producing the most liquidity,
there is considerable variation in the deposit flow rates. even within banks in the same
group.
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the smallest banks $1.96 are reallocated. Similarly, for core and large time-deposits, for
every $1 of outflow at the largest banks, $1.9 and $1.7 are reallocated amongst banks of
similar size, while $1.9 are reallocated amongst the smallest banks.
These findings suggest that the largest banks both attract and retain more deposits
compared to the smaller banks, for every dollar of deposit outflow. Since the largest banks
also have the most number of branches, these higher ratios of deposit inflows to outflows
at the largest banks suggests the importance of branch networks, not only in in their
ability to attract deposits, but also in reducing information asymmetry and monitoring
costs (Aguirregabiria et al., 2017), and thus retaining more deposits. This monotonic
trend in the ratios of deposit inflows-to-outflows and reallocation-to-outflows to cannot
be captured with deposit growth rates, or deposit market share alone, and is thus valuable
in understanding the funding risks faced by community banks vis-a-vis larger banks.
Deposits are not only reallocated amongst banks in similar size groups, but also across
groups. I find that nearly 60% of the reallocation of core deposits is inter-group, while
for large time-deposits it is only 30% , the rest being intra-group. We saw that while the
rates of reallocation of large time-deposits is higher than that for core deposits (9.1% vs.
2%, refer Table 1), large time-deposits are largely reallocated across banks of similar size.
This suggests that the reallocation of large time-deposits is largely due to heterogeneity in
bank-level dynamics within similar size groups, and not so much as differences in banking
practices between the largest and smaller banks.
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Table 7. Deposit Flows Across Bank Size-Groups
N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Largest Banks ←→ Large Banks
Total Deposits 135 0.446 0.244 0.037 0.915
Core Deposits 135 0.407 0.253 0.019 0.931
Large Time-Deposits 135 0.695 0.186 0.272 0.990
Largest Banks ←→ Average Banks
Total Deposits 135 0.441 0.263 0.049 0.954
Core Deposits 135 0.406 0.275 0.021 0.974
Large Time-Deposits 135 0.674 0.211 0.161 0.992
Largest Banks ←→ Median Banks
Total Deposits 135 0.443 0.271 0.043 0.971
Core Deposits 135 0.410 0.283 0.022 0.979
Large Time-Deposits 135 0.673 0.215 0.150 0.987
Largest Banks ←→ Small Banks
Total Deposits 135 0.447 0.275 0.040 0.974
Core Deposits 135 0.413 0.286 0.030 0.973
Large Time-Deposits 135 0.674 0.220 0.134 0.989
Note: Table 7 shows the index of inter-group deposit flows between the very largest banks
and banks of other sizes. The index is constructed using the methodology of (Davis and
Haltiwanger, 1992). An index value of 0 indicates that all flows are inter-group, whereas
an index value of 1 indicates that all flows are intra-group. Index value greater than
0.5 indicates that flows are largely intra-group, while those below 0.5 indicate that flows
are largely inter-group. We can see that for the sample period, on an average, around
55-60% of the flow of total and core deposits are inter-group, and the remaining 40-
45% are intra-group. However, for large time-deposits, we see that around 67-70% of all
deposit flows are intra-group, and only 30-33% are inter-group. In Table 6 we saw that
there is considerable variation in deposit flow rates, even within banks in the same size
groups, here we see that this heterogeneity in the liquidity production promotes the flow
of deposits across banks in different size groups. While we can see that deposits flows
across banks of different size groups, the index does not tell us on the direction of deposit
flows.
These reallocation figures however do not give us the direction of deposit flows. I
develop on the methodology used by Meller and Metiu (2017) to measure synchronization
of economic cycles across countries, to ascertain the direction of deposit flows.
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Table 8. Reallocation Of Deposits - Very Largest Banks Vs. All Other Banks
Mean Trend
Total Deposits Core Deposits Large Time-Deposits Total Deposits Core Deposits Large Time-Deposits
Full Sample −0.0208 −0.0080 −0.0645 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.0002
(Q2,1984 - Q4,2017) (0.9508) (0.7406) (1.0000) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Pre Reigle-Neal −0.1082 −0.0995 −0.0708 −0.006∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.007∗∗∗
(Q2,1984 - Q3,1994) (1.0000) (1.0000) (0.9999) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Post Reigle-Neal 0.0163 0.0308∗∗ −0.0618 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.00005
(Q3,1994 - Q4,2017) (0.1208) (0.0142) (1.0000) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001)
Post Gramm–Leach–Bliley 0.062∗∗∗ 0.0800∗∗∗ −0.0756 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(Q1,2000 - Q4,2017) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (1.0000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003)
Note: While Table 7 showed us that here is considerable reallocation of deposits across banks of different sizes, it did not tell us anything
on the direction of these deposit flows. To overcome this limitation I construct a directionality measure to ascertain the direction of deposit
reallocation between the largest banks and the other banks. Table 8 shows the mean and the trend in direction of deposit reallocation
across time periods. The direction is computed as flows between small banks and the very largest banks. A net positive value indicates
that deposits are reallocated from smallest banks to the largest banks, while a net negative value indicates otherwise. We see that post
Reigle-Neal (Q3,1994), there is a net reallocation of total and core deposits from smaller to the largest banks and this effect becomes
even stronger post Gramm–Leach–Bliley, 1999 (GLB). We also see that the overall trend is is positive post Riegle-Neal for all deposit
types. One possible explanation for this effect could be the “economies of scale” enabled by Riegle-Neal which allowed banks to acquire
other banks and operate across state boundaries and become largeer, and the “economies of scope” enabled by GLB that allowed banks
to engage in investment banking and insurance business in additional to commercial banking activities.
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Table 8 show the mean and trend in directionality index for deposit reallocation. Pos-
itive values indicate a reallocation of deposits from smaller to the largest banks, negative
values indicate otherwise. We see that for total and core deposits, on average, deposits
are reallocated from small banks to large banks, and this effect is more pronounced post
Riegle-Neal (RN) and post Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB). Directionality index is 0.0620∗∗∗
for total deposits post GLB. For core deposits its is 0.0308∗∗ post RN, and 0.0800∗∗∗ post
GLB. I do not see any such evidence of deposit reallocation for large time-deposits. I also
see that the trend in the direction of deposit reallocation is positive for the whole sample
period, except for the pre Riegle-Neal period during which it was negative. One possible
explanation for this effect could be the “economies of scale” enabled by RN which allowed
banks to acquire other banks and operate across state boundaries and become larger, and
the “economies of scope” enabled by GLB that allowed banks to engage in investment
banking and insurance business in additional to commercial banking activities. Both the
scale and scope effects allowed the banks to establish relationships with depositors, and
hence the effect is evident more for core deposits which are more relationship based com-
pared to large time-deposits. Combining the findings on the rates of inflows and outflows
across bank size groups with the magnitude and direction of deposit outflows at smaller
banks, these findings suggest that smaller banks have been losing deposits to the largest
banks, and may be more vulnerable to deposit outflows and funding shortages compared
to their larger counterparts.
Bank Specific Attributes Affecting Deposit Flows
In the preceding section(s), I established that there are simultaneous inflow and outflow
of deposits, these flows are large in magnitude, they vary with economic and market
conditions, and across bank size groups. We found that these inflows, outflows, and
reallocation of deposits is a persistent feature of the banking system. This section explores
other attributes that could potentially explain deposit flows. I examine the ways in which
depositors derive utility from bank deposits, and how each of these factors affects deposit
flows. I consider three main factors, as mentioned in Egan, Hortaçsu, et al. (2017), namely
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deposit rates offered, insolvency risk, and ability to effectively utilize deposits. Each of
these are discussed in the sections below.
Deposit Rate Advantages
To interpret my results I use the framework of DeAngelo and Stulz (2015), who sug-
gest that banks that enjoy deposit rate advantages over their peers should have lower
leverage and consequently lower (higher) rates of deposit inflows (outflows). Deposit rate
advantage is computed as the percentage of branch-products in which a given bank offers
deposit rates lower than the median MSA rate for that product. Table 9 shows the rates
of deposit inflows, outflows, and reallocation in the highest and the lowest decile groups
ranked on deposit rate advantages. I find that deposit inflows for the banks in the highest
group are nearly 25% compared to to banks in the lowest decile group. Similarly core de-
posit inflows are nearly 23% lower, and large time-deposit inflows are 15% lower. Deposit
outflows at banks in the highest decile are nearly 38% than banks in the lowest decile.
Similarly outflows are 20% and 56% higher for core and large time-deposits respectively.
We also see that rates of reallocation are higher for the banks in the highest decile, and
this is consistent across deposit types.
As another measure, I scale the deposit rate advantage measure computed earlier
with the banks’ net interest margin. This enables us to examine whether the high (low)
deposit rate advantage eventually results in higher (lower) interest margins. However,
here we see that while deposit inflows are lower at banks in the highest decile, outflows
and rates of reallocation are also lower compared to banks in the lowest decile, and this
is consistent across deposit types.
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Table 9. Deposit Flow Measures: Bank Attributes
Total Deposits Core Deposits Large Time-Deposits
POSD NEGD EXCD POSD NEGD EXCD POSD NEGD EXCD
Deposit Rate Advantage
High 0.047 0.011 0.021 0.047 0.012 0.023 0.075 0.039 0.061
Low 0.062 0.008 0.016 0.061 0.010 0.019 0.088 0.025 0.046
High / Low 0.75 1.38 1.31 0.77 1.20 1.21 0.85 1.56 1.33
Deposit Rate Advantage/ Interest Margin
High 0.051 0.009 0.015 0.051 0.010 0.016 0.079 0.037 0.053
Low 0.054 0.011 0.018 0.055 0.010 0.017 0.086 0.043 0.055
High / Low 0.94 0.81 0.83 0.93 1.00 0.94 0.92 0.86 0.96
NPA
High 0.035 0.023 0.034 0.040 0.022 0.034 0.055 0.060 0.073
Low 0.061 0.013 0.023 0.066 0.013 0.024 0.103 0.146 0.071
High / Low 0.57 1.77 1.48 0.60 1.69 1.42 0.53 0.41 1.03
Capital Ratio
High 0.062 0.025 0.041 0.068 0.024 0.039 0.094 0.062 0.089
Low 0.046 0.013 0.023 0.049 0.013 0.024 0.074 0.047 0.070
High / Low 1.35 1.92 1.78 1.38 1.85 1.63 1.27 1.32 1.27
Note: Table 9 shows the rates of deposit inflows, outflows, and excess reallocation based
on bank attributes, across deposit types. High group represents banks in the top decile
and Low group is for banks in the bottom decile for that measure. Deposit Rate Advan-
tage is computed as the percentage of branch-products where a bank offers deposit rates
lower than the median rate for a particular product in a given MSA. NPA is the ratio of
Non-Performing Assets / Total Loans, and Equity Capital Ratio is Total Equity Capital
/ Total Assets. We see that rates of deposit inflows is nearly 15% - 25% lower for banks
that have a high deposit rate advantage, while deposit outflows are nearly 20% - 56%
higher. However, when the deposit rate advantage is scaled by interest margin, we see
that while rates of inflow are lower for banks in the highest decile, the rates of outflows
are also lower. We also see that the rates of inflows are nearly 40% - 47% lower at banks
with high NPA, while deposit outflows are 69% - 77% higher. For large time-deposits
however, the rate of outflows is lower for banks in the highest decile of NPA’s. Across
capital levels, we see that both inflows, outflows, and the rates of excess reallocation are
higher for banks in the highest decile.
I further compute the directionality measure for deposit flows based on deposit rate
advantages. If indeed depositors are rational and return seeking, ceteris paribus one
should expect to see deposits flow from banks offering lower deposit rates (higher deposit
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rate advantage) to banks with higher deposit rates (lower deposit rate advantages). Table
10 shows the direction of deposit flows. As one would expect the directionality index is
negative, indicating that deposits move from banks in the higher group to banks in the
lower group. The directionality index is −0.0783∗∗∗ for total deposits, −0.0493∗∗∗ for core
deposits, and −0.1269∗∗∗ for large time deposits. When considering the scaled version
of deposit rate advantage, the results are only significant for large time-deposits, which
have a directionality index of −0.0155∗.
My findings are consistent with the model of DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) and show
that depositors are rational and return seeking, and thus deposits are reallocated to banks
which provide depositors with a higher utility via higher deposit rates.
Insolvency Risk
Utility derived by depositors from bank also depends from the banks’ insolvency risk.
While uninsured depositors would be most at risk since they would lose their deposits in
case of a bank failure, even insured depositors would face some loss in utility from the
extinguishment of depositor-bank relationship. Saunders and Wilson (1996) find that
informed depositors can ex-ante identify failing and non-failing banks and withdraw their
deposits in anticipation of a bank failure. Egan, Hortaçsu, et al. (2017) echo a similar
sentiment that depositors are fully rational and move their deposits from distressed banks
to healthy banks.
I examine whether aggregate deposit flows are affected by banks’ “unconditional” insol-
vency risk. I measure the “unconditional” insolvency risk as the ratio of Non-Performing
Assets (NPA’s) / Total Loans.7 Heitz and Narayanamoorthy (2018) suggest that NPA’s
are a good proxy for a timely measure of a banks’ probability of default. Moreover, a
high level of NPA’s as percentage of total loans indicates that the bank may sooner or
later face the risk of insolvency.
7I stress on the word “unconditional” since the actual insolvency risk is more likely to be determined
by the level of NPA’s, conditional on the amount of loan loss reserves and equity capital.
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Table 9 show the rates of deposit inflows, outflows, and reallocation for groups in the
highest and lowest deciles of their NPA ratio. I find that deposit inflows at banks in the
highest decile are nearly 43% lower and outflows are nearly 77% compared to banks in
the lowest decile. Trend are similar for core deposits, where inflows are 40% lower and
outflows are 69% higher, and for large time-deposits where inflows are 47% lower and
outflows are 40% higher. Deposit reallocation rates are 48%, 42%, and 3% higher for
banks in the highest decile, for total, core, and large time-deposits respectively.
I also examine the direction of deposit flows. If depositors can perceive insolvency
risk at banks, one should expect to see negative values for directionality index. From
Table 10 we see that on average deposits are reallocated from banks in the highest decile
to banks in the lowest decile of NPA ratio. Directionality index is −0.1923∗∗∗ for total
deposits, −0.1573∗∗∗ for core deposits, and −0.1351∗∗∗ for large time-deposits.
My findings demonstrate that depositors are informative and hence the lower (higher)
rates of inflows (outflows) at banks in the highest decile on NPA’s. We also see that
depositors move their deposits from banks that have higher insolvency risk to banks with
lower insolvency risk, suggest some evidence of market discipline.
Equity Capital
I next examine the effect of the level of equity capital on deposit flow rates. In addition
to deposit rates and insolvency risk, depositors also derive utility from how well the bank
is able to use these deposits to generate returns sufficient enough to repay the depositors
(Egan, Hortaçsu, et al., 2017). Equity capital can either aid in this process by reducing
insolvency risk, which is the “risk absorption” hypothesis or it could hinder this process
by reducing banks’ incentives to screen and monitor its borrowers, which is the “financial
fragility crowding-out” hypotheses.8
Table 9 shows the rates of deposit inflows, outflows, and reallocation for banks in
8The terms “risk absorption” hypothesis and “financial fragility crowding-out” hypothesis have been
borrowed from (Berger and Bouwman, 2009).
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the highest and lowest deciles ranked according to level of equity capital. I find that
on average deposit inflows are nearly 35% higher at banks in the highest decile, and this
percentage varies from 38% for core deposits to 27% for large time-deposits. I also see that
deposit outflows are nearly 92% higher and deposit reallocation is nearly 78% higher for
banks in the highest decile. The findings lend support to the “risk absorption” hypothesis
that equity capital reduces banks’ insolvency risk and consequently banks with higher
equity capital have higher rates of deposit inflows and reallocation. However, the high
rates of deposit outflows also suggest that high equity levels hinder a banks’ screening
and monitoring ability, consistent with the “financial fragility crowding out” hypothesis.
Table 10 shows the directionality index for deposit reallocation. We see that on
average, deposits are reallocated from banks in the highest decile to banks in the lowest
decile. Directionality index is −0.0680∗∗∗ for total deposits, −0.0755∗∗∗ for core deposits,
and −0.0325∗∗∗ for large time-deposits. The directionality measure lends support to
the “financial fragility crowding-out” hypothesis, suggesting that lower capital levels aid
banks’ screening and monitoring roles, and hence deposits are reallocated from banks
with higher levels of equity capital to those with lower levels.
My findings are consistent with both the “risk absorption” and the “financial fragility
crowding-out” hypotheses. One possible explanation for these contradictory results is that
both leverage and equity capital ratios have regulatory upper and lower bounds, respec-
tively. Another aspect could be that minimum required regulatory capital is computed on
an assets’ risk weight, which may or may not have the same effect on deposit flows, than
if it were based on the assets liquidity creation weight. Furthermore, while theoretically
a bank could obtain deposits as desired, regulatory interventions could prevent the bank
from obtaining certain kinds of deposits.9
9For example, a bank that is below the “Well Capitalized” status cannot obtain or renew brokered
deposits without the regulators approval.
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Table 10. Direction of Deposit Reallocation
Total Deposits Core Deposits Large Time-Deposits
Deposit Rate Advantage
−0.0783∗∗∗ −0.0493∗∗∗ −0.1269∗∗∗
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)





(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
Capital Ratio
−0.0680∗∗∗ −0.0755∗∗∗ −0.0325∗∗∗
(< 0.0001) (< 0.0001) (< 0.0001)
Note: Table 10 shows the direction of deposit reallocation across banks for a variety of
measures. Net positive values indicate that on average, over the sample period, deposits
are reallocated from banks in the Low group to banks in the High group, negative values
indicate otherwise. We see that in addition to lower rates of deposit inflows and higher
rates of deposit outflows at banks which have a high deposit rate advantage, deposits
are reallocated from the high group to the low group. Similarly, we see that deposits
are reallocated from banks with high levels of NPA to those with lower levels. For
capital levels, while we saw banks in the high group had higher levels of deposit inflow
and outflow rates, on average deposits are reallocated from the high group to the low
group. These results are consistent across deposit types. These findings suggest that on
average, depositors move from banks that provide them low utility to banks which give
the depositors higher utility.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the flow of deposits in the banking system by computing measures of
deposit inflows, outflows, and the reallocation of deposits. I find that deposit inflows are
larger in magnitude and volatile than deposit outflows. At any given time period there
are simultaneous inflows and outflows of deposits, even in time periods of new deposit
outflows. Across deposit types, the magnitude of inflows for core deposits is larger than
large time-deposits, but both have similar magnitudes of deposit outflows. Moreover, the
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inflows and outflows of core and large time-deposits are affected differently by business
and economic conditions. The findings suggest that better understand banking system
stability, one needs to consider both deposit inflows and outflows and the heterogeneity
in flows across deposit types.
I also find that there is substantial reallocation of deposits across banks. I find that
large banks are able to attract and retain more deposits compared to their smaller coun-
terparts. In addition to attracting and retaining more deposits, large banks have been
attracting deposits away from smaller banks, and this effect is more evident after Riegle-
Neal and Gramm Leach Bliley Acts. The findings suggest that deposit funding stability
could be an issue of grater concern for smaller banks compared to the large banks.
Lastly, I examine the flow of deposits based on the utility depositors generate from the
banks. I find that deposits largely flow to banks that provide better utility to depositors,
in terms of deposit rates offered, solvency risk of the bank, and banking efficiency. These
findings attest to the market disciplining role of depositors.
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2 Accounting Information and Deposit Rates
2.1 Introduction
Accounting information in financial reports is intended to reduce the information asym-
metry between banks’ users and suppliers of funds. Prior literature has largely studied
this reduction in information asymmetry through bank accounting information and its
effect on equity markets, debt markets, and regulators. However, literature on the role
of financial reporting in reducing information asymmetry between a banks’ borrowers
and depositors seems to be lacking (Beatty and Liao, 2014). This paper attempts to fill
that gap in the literature by examining the relation between the largest accrual reported
on banks’ financial statements, i.e. Loan Loss Provisions (LLPs) and deposit rates on
uninsured deposits. I focus exclusively on rates on uninsured deposits as these are the
most sensitive to bank risk since these deposits would be lost in case of bank failure.10
My main findings are as follows: (i) Higher provisions lead to higher deposits rates,
and this effect is more pronounced in banks which have a publicly listed Bank Holding
Company (BHC), and after the financial crisis. (ii) This effect is more pronounced for
the non-discretionary component of LLPs which reflects the losses expected on the loan
portfolio, compared to the discretionary component which reflects managements’ private
information and could be used as a signaling tool by the management. (iii) Timeliness of
provisioning leads to lower deposit rates, and this effect is evident after the financial crisis
irrespective of whether the banks’ BHC is publicly listed or not. (iv) Non-discretionary
provisions at banks with higher loan growth, higher earnings, and conservatism in Al-
lowance for Lease and Loan Losses (ALLL) accounting leads to higher deposit rates,
while conservatism in Loan Charge-Offs (CO) accounting leads to lower deposit rates.
(v) Non-discretionary provisioning at banks with higher loan concentrations reduces de-
posit rates, while provisioning at banks’ with higher Commercial Real Estate (CRE),
Commercial & Industrial Loans, and Consumer Loans leads to higher rates. And lastly,
(vi) non-discretionary provisions that contribute to economic capital (in excess of Tier 2
10Uninsured deposits are defined as time deposits ≥ $100,000 prior to Q1,2010 and time deposits ≥
$250,000 since.
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regulatory capital) leads to lower deposit rates, while discretionary provisions in excess
of regulatory capital lead to higher deposit rates.
Before beginning an analysis of my findings, we must understand that for banks trans-
parency via financial reporting is a double-edged sword. On the one hand transparency
is vital in ensuring that depositors respond to fundamental based runs as against infor-
mation based runs which are inefficient (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991b). Transparency can
also increase market discipline as depositors can penalize banks for taking excessive risk
by either withdrawing deposits or demanding higher deposit rates (Martinez Peria and
Schmukler (2001); Park and Peristiani (1998) and Cook and Spellman (1994)). It can
also enable banks to raise funds during periods of monetary tightening (Holod and Peek,
2007). On the other hand Dang et al. (2017) argue that banks are optimally opaque, and
Dang et al. (2017) and Holmstrom (2008) argue that increasing transparency may affect
the value of money created by banks. Opaqueness could also lead to inefficient economic
outcomes such as purely information based bank runs (Morris and Shin, 2002) and (Chen
and Hasan, 2006).
To understand the role financial reporting plays in determining deposit rates I start
with the basic premise that rates are primarily determined by the supply of and the
demand for deposits. Theoretical models such as Allen et al. (2015) suggest that the
supply of deposits in based deposit rates offered by banks vis-a-vis returns offered to
depositors by alternate storage technologies. To encourage investors to deposit their
money at banks, deposit rates should incorporate a premium over the alternate storage
technology. As banks can default endogenously (Egan, Hortaçsu, et al., 2017), leading
to a loss of deposits, the deposit rate premium should incorporate bank specific distress
risk. This risk premium is determined by the quantity and quality of information made
available to depositors via financial reports and other means, which depositors use to
assess the riskiness of the bank.
Even within financial reporting, reported accounting figures can be viewed via two
different lenses. One is the direct impact of the accounting number which reveals the true
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underlying economic situation of the bank, subject to applicable accounting principles.
Elliott et al. (1991) find that the equity markets react negatively to increases in charge-
offs since it directly affects the level of loan loss reserves. On the other hand accounting
number could also signal managements’ private information, and the interpretation of
this signal is conditional on the decision at hand (Dechow et al., 2010). Beaver and Engel
(1996) and Elliott et al. (1991) find that markets react positively to increases in LLPs
as this signals that banks have enough earning power to withstand some losses on their
loan portfolios.
Moreover, deposit rates are an input to a banks’ deposit productivity function (Egan,
Lewellen, et al., 2017) which eventually translates into loan creation and thus overall
value for the bank. If these deposit rates are affected by financial reporting and the
interpretation of the accounting information it gives us a channel to understand how
financial reporting creates value for a bank.
Firstly, we see that higher provisioning led to lower deposit rates on 12-month and
higher rates on 60-month uninsured certificates of deposits (CD’s), and this effect was
only evident for banks with a publicly listed BHC prior to the crisis. During and post-
crisis we see that increases in LLP’s lead to increases in deposit rates for both 12-month
and 60-month CDs irrespective of whether the banks’ BHC is publicly listed or not.
Moreover, timeliness in provisioning led to lower deposit rates prior to the crisis, but only
for 60-month CD’s for publicly listed banks. However, post-crisis this effect is observable
across both product types and irrespective of the listing nature of the BHC. My findings
suggest that either post-crisis the incremental information obtained on publicly listed
banks from sources other than regulatory reports has lost its effect, or depositors are able
to generate the same information from regulatory reports.
We also see that while non-discretionary provisions lead to higher deposit rates, discre-
tionary provisions are largely not priced by depositors. This suggests that unlike equity
providers, depositors value the direct impact of provisions, via reduction in the amount
of interest generating assets, compared to banks’ signal on the future profitability of the
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bank, which is priced by equity holders. This is consistent with the maturity risk of each
security type, as depositors are more concerned about immediate interest payment rather
than the long term value creation.
We have seen that non-discretionary provisions are priced by depositors but not dis-
cretionary provisions suggesting that depositors value the direct impact of accounting
figures and not so much about the signal indicated by them. I next examine the effect of
bank performance metrics and accounting conservatism measures on deposit rates. We
see that higher loan growth accompanied by higher levels of non-discretionary provisions
leads to increases in deposit rates, and this effect is most evident during and after the
financial crisis. These findings suggest that investors perceive the high loan growth to
be an indication of poorer loan quality and would be expected to go bad in the future.
Higher non-discretionary provisions accompanied by higher earnings also leads to higher
deposit rates. This could suggest that depositors perceive the higher earnings to be a
result of riskier loans made in the past, which are now beginning to go bad.
In addition to bank performance measures, I look at how the effect of non-discretionary
provisions and conservatism in ALLL and CO affects deposit rates. I find that banks that
are conservative in their ALLL i.e have a higher than median ratio of ALLL as percentage
of Non-Performing Assets (NPA’s) have higher deposit rates, while banks that are more
conservative in their CO’s have lower deposit rates. These findings are contrary to the
findings seen for equity holders where higher provisions lead to higher returns while higher
CO’s lead to lower returns. These findings suggest that banks that are holding higher
loan loss reserves are penalized by depositors, while banks which are more willing to
write-off non-performing loans tend to pay a lower deposit rate.
We have seen that higher loan growth accompanied by higher non-discretionary pro-
visions is viewed unfavorably by depositors and leads to higher deposit rates. I next
examine the combined effect of non-discretionary provisions and loan portfolio char-
acteristics on deposit rates. We see that higher loan concentrations accompanied by
higher non-discretionary provisions leads to lower deposit rates. High loan concentra-
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tions could suggest either riskiness in the loan portfolio or the banks’ expertise in lending
to a particular sector. Whether it is riskiness or industry expertise depositors view higher
non-discretionary provisions as banks’ acknowledgment in identifying troubled loans thus
leading to lower deposit rates. High loan growth across loan categories accompanies
by higher non-discretionary provisions is viewed negatively and leads to higher deposit
rates. This effect is largely consistent post financial crisis, albeit prior to the financial
crisis prior and during the crisis we see lower deposit rates on 60-month CD’s experi-
encing high Commercial Real Estate (CRE) loan growth. Thus far my findings have
suggested that depositors value the direct impact of accounting information in pricing
deposits, however we see that the lower deposit rates on banks with high loan concentra-
tion could suggest that depositors also value the signaling aspect of financial reporting
to some extent.
Lastly I look at the effect of provisions, both non-discretionary and discretionary,
when they add to economic capital (Loan loss allowance in excess of Tier 2 regulatory
capital). While additions to Tier 2 regulatory capital (and consequently to the Total
Risk Based Capital Ratio) can allow a bank to increase its lending activities, increases
to the economic capital increases the solvency risk for the bank. In case of loan default
and charge-offs, economic capital acts as a buffer before Tier 2 and Tier 1 capital get
eroded. We see that when non-discretionary provisions add to economic capital deposit
rates are lower, while when discretionary provisions add to economic capital, deposit rates
are higher. These findings further suggest that depositors are more concerned about the
direct impact of accounting numbers reported in financial statements than the signal they
provide.
In this study I have examined the changes in the deposit rates of uninsured deposits
and how financial reporting and accounting information affect them. We have seen that
largely depositors price the direct impact of accounting figures into deposit rates, while the
private information signaled in the accounting numbers is not as valuable to depositors.
This study shows that transparency in financial reporting is accompanied by market
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discipline reflected in the changes in deposit rates.
2.2 Background, Related Literature, and Hypotheses
As financial intermediaries, banks transform demandable deposits into illiquid loans, and
in the process acquire proprietary information on the borrower. While this proprietary
information reduces the information asymmetry between the borrower and the bank, the
principal-agent problem between depositors and the bank remains. Calomiris and Kahn
(1991a) suggest that the nature of demandable deposits should ensure bank managers’
actions are incentive compatible, however the presence of deposit insurance can induce
moral hazard and exacerbate the agency problem.
Even if the demandable nature of deposits could address this agency problem, not all
deposits are alike. Some deposits are relationship based, and seek the banks’ liquidity,
payment, and transaction services, while others are more like capital providers, and seek
returns on their investment. Broadly, deposits can be classified as “Core Deposits” and
“Non-Core Deposits”. As per Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR) definitions11,
Core Deposits are the sum of Demand Deposits, Transaction Accounts, Money Market
Deposit Accounts (MMDA’s), Savings Accounts and all Small Time Deposits, while Non-
Core Deposits include all Large Time Deposits.12
Core deposits are primarily from customers who utilize the banks’ services (such as the
ability to write checks), and are likely to have a long-term and/or multiple relationships
with the bank, either via deposit accounts, loans, credit cards, or otherwise. Given the
nature of their relationship, and the costs involved in switching banks, these depositors
are less likely leave the bank and, and are hence considered to be “stable” sources of
funding. Martin et al. (2018) find that even a failing bank, core depositors were less
likely to leave the bank, compared to uninsured depositors. With the implementation of
Basel III, beginning 2018, banks are required to maintain minimum levels of Net Stable
11https://www.ffiec.gov/ubpr.htm
12Prior to December 2008, Large Time Deposits were defined as those greater than $100K, post
December 2008, they are defined as accounts greater than $250K.
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Funding Ratio (NSFR), make core deposits even more valuable.
Large time deposits on the other hand are “return seeking”, and have little-to-no
relationship with the bank per se. These deposits are likely to be obtained via deposit
brokers, and internet listing services among other sources, and the investors in these
products are primarily sophisticated individuals or corporations. In addition, these large
time deposits are partially uninsured13, and given the time nature of these deposits, the
long term health of the bank is an important factor for these depositors.
Given these differences in the nature of deposits, the deposit rates for these two
categories also have different properties. The stickiness or inflexibility in rate movements
in response to changing environments is higher for core deposits than it is for certificates of
deposits (CD’s) (Driscoll and Judson, 2013), and depositor discipline to changes in bank
risk is higher for large deposits (Park and Peristiani, 1998). Additionally (Iyer, Puri,
and Ryan, 2016) find that depositors that have multiple relationships with the bank, or
have older accounts are less likely to run in the event of a low-solvency-risk-shock to the
bank, and (Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001) shows that deposit insurance does not
diminish the effect of market discipline.
So if large time deposits are “return seeking”, have no relationship with the bank, and
are likely to leave the bank in case of increased risk, the deposit rates for these products
should be associated with the riskiness of the bank, as ascertained from the accounting in-
formation in the banks’ financial reports. For this study, I use loan loss provisions (LLPs)
as a “catch-all” measure for banks’ asset quality, with higher LLPs reflecting poorer as-
set quality, and study the impact of LLPs on deposit rates. I use LLPs as a “catch-all”
measure as prior accounting literature has shown that LLPs themselves are determined
by banks’ profitability levels, capital levels, macro economic conditions, and prior losses
on the loan portfolio. A summary of these models is given in (Beatty and Liao, 2014).
Moreover, Bushman (2014) suggests that managerial accounting decisions as reflected in
13Deposits were insured up to $100K till December 2008, subsequently the deposit insurance limit
was increased to $250K
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the accounting numbers can be classified into two broad categories. The first reflecting
the is a non-discretionary component which reflects the underlying aconomic behavior,
the second being the discretionary component which is used to signal managements’ pri-
vate information. Therefore, I study the differential effect of non-discretionary (which
reflect only asset quality), and discretionary (which may reflect managerial opportunism
and signaling) provisions on deposit rates. I state my first hypotheses as:
Hypothesis H1a: High loan loss provisions lead to increases in deposit rates for large
certificates of deposits (CD’s).
Hypothesis H1b: Higher non-discretionary provisions lead to increases in deposit rates
for large certificates of deposits (CD’s), while the effect is not as prominent for discre-
tionary provisions.
Financial reporting is intended to reduce information asymmetry between capital
providers and managers by transforming unobservable firm performance into easily in-
terpretable numbers. The response of capital providers to accounting information is
conditional on the informativeness of this data, which is a function of the quantity and
quality of data. Similarly, for loan loss provisions to be informative to deposit holders in
assessing the asset quality and consequently bank specific risk, any incremental informa-
tion would be informative. One such incremental piece of information is the timeliness of
provisioning. Loan loss recognition is conditional on managements’ subjective assessment
on the probability of loan default, subject to relevant accounting principles. Thus, man-
agers can delay recognition of loan losses if it is beneficial to them, possibly in managing
earnings or capital, or otherwise. But delaying loss recognition can cause an overhang
problem for the bank and may even affect its future lending behavior (Beatty and Liao,
2011), and can increase a banks’ risk profile (Bushman and Williams, 2015). Timeliness
in provisioning on the other hand can reduce this potential overhang and be beneficial to
banks’ health especially during cyclical downturns (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). There-
fore one would expect depositors to price the timeliness of provisioning in addition to the
amount of provisions made.
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Additionally, while all banks , private or public, have to submit financial information
on their operations to their respective supervisory agencies each quarter, banks which
have a publicly listed Bank Holding Company (BHC), in addition to filing quarterly
reports with the supervisory agency, have to file additional reports with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). (Holod and Peek, 2007) show that publicly traded
banks have a lower level information asymmetry compared to private banks. Along
similar lines Nichols et al. (2009) find that publicly listed firms are more conservative
in their accounting practices. This additional reduction in information asymmetry, and
accounting conservatism should be priced in deposit rates. I state my second hypothesis
as:
Hypothesis H2: Timeliness in provisioning is viewed favorably and leads to lower
deposit rates, and being part of a publicly listed BHC strengthens these results.
While accounting information reduces the information asymmetry between the two
contracting parties, namely capital providers and managers, the response by capital
providers to particular set of information is conditional on the decision-relevance frame-
work (Dechow et al., 2010). For example, a higher non-interest expense would be viewed
differently for a bank that is expanding and opening new branches, than for a bank
that is not. Similarly, a banks’ loan growth rate, earnings, accounting conservatism, and
loan portfolio characteristics would be priced by a banks’ depositors conditional on the
performance measure of the banks’ peers.
A bank growing faster than its peers could be achieving this growth on the basis
of lowered credit underwriting standards (Clair, 1992), eventually resulting in increased
loan losses (Foos et al., 2010). Additionally, higher earnings achieved on the basis of high
loan growth, and followed by increases in provisions could be an indication of poor asset
quality. On the other hand a highly concentrated loan portfolio could reflect manage-
ments’ skill in a particular industry and hence viewed favorably by depositors (Berger
and Sedunov, 2017), or it could indicate risky loan portfolios (Berger and Bouwman,
2013). Managers’ accounting conservatism could also be priced by investors. Kothari
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et al. (2009) find that managers tend to delay bad news up to a certain point, while they
release good news immediately, which is priced in equity returns. Even within accounting
measures, conservatism could be viewed differently across measures. Beaver and Engel
(1996) find that conservatism in accounting for loan loss reserves, i.e. recognition of loan
losses is viewed favorably by equity as investors as they perceive this recognition as bank
managements’ ability to identify and deal with troubled loans in a timely manner. Grif-
fin and Wallach (1991) find a similar reaction for banks in Latin America. Elliott et al.
(1991) on the other hand find a negative reaction by equity investors to recognition of
loan charge-offs as this directly reduces the loan loss reserve buffer for the banks. I state
my third hypothesis as:
Hypothesis H3: Higher non-discretionary provisions accompanied with high loan
growth, high earnings, and conservatism in loan loss reserves lead to higher deposit rates,
while loan concentration and conservatism in charge-offs leads to lower deposit rates.
Finally, being a regulated industry, all banks have to maintain minimum capital levels
to be considered “Well Capitalized”, failing which, as per Section 29 of the FDIC Act14,
the bank may face restrictions on accepting certain kinds of deposits or even restrictions
on deposit rates offered. Loan loss reserves currently contribute to Tier 2 capital and
thus total regulatory capital. While these loan loss reserves are expected to increase
the safety buffer available to the bank, it could end up increasing the risk a bank takes.
Ng and Roychowdhury (2014) find that during the financial crisis, these extra buffers
actually enabled banks to take on higher risks, by contributing to regulatory capital
which eventually contributed to their failure. While maintaining minimum amounts of
regulatory capital is paramount, banks also maintain reserves in excess of regulatory
capital that adds to the overall economic capital available to the bank to absorb losses on
the loan portfolio. So a bank that might otherwise appear to be risky, may be perceived
differently by its capital providers if it is maintaining sufficient reserves, in excess of those




Hypothesis H4: Loan loss provisions when adding to economic capital (in excess of
Tier 2 regulatory capital) lowers deposit rates.
2.3 Research Design
Base Model of Deposit Rates
To examine whether bank specific risk, as inferred from accounting information in finan-
cial reports is priced in deposit rates for large CD’s, I start with a base model of deposit
rates:
Deposit Ratei,t = Base Ratet +Bank Specific Risk Premiumi,t
Where Deposit Ratei,t is the deposit rate for bank i at time t. Without loss of generality,
the model for deposit rates for bank i, product j and time t can be written as:
rijt = αi + θt +
p∑
i=1
βiXit + ηijt (1)
Where rijt is the deposit rate for bank i, product j at time t, αi are bank fixed effects, θt
are time fixed effects that equally affect the rate on product j at time t across all banks,
and Xit are the risk premium (risk factors inferred from financial reports) for bank i at
time t. For my study, I use the deposit rates on partially insured 12-month and 60-month
CD’s as rijt.
Bank Specific Risk Factors
To study whether bank specific risk is priced in deposit rates, I use a parsimonious model
and focus specifically on two items, namely the Loan Loss Provisions (LLPs), which
reflect the credit risk in the loan portfolio, and the Allowance for Lease and Loan Losses
(ALLL) reserve, which reflects the safety buffer a bank has against expected losses. Each
of these is discussed in detail in the following sections.
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Loan Loss Provisions
Loan Loss Provisions (henceforth LLPs) are the single largest accrual available to bank
managers, and incorporate the managers’ private information on the quality of loans.
For the 2005-2012 period, LLPs accounted for nearly 56% of total accruals (Beatty and
Liao, 2014) at banks. LLPs reflect managements’ assessment of losses expected in the loan
portfolio, albeit the timing and amount of these losses only have to “reasonably” certain at
the time of provisioning. The provisioning regime for my sample period, also known as the
“incurred loss” approach, is guided by FAS 114 - Accounting by Creditors for Impairment
of a Loan (FASB, 1993). It states that for a banks’ managers to record a provision for
an impaired loan the loss must be “probable”, “estimable” to a certain degree, and the
“credit event” should have occurred. Since provisioning requires managerial judgment
in determining the “probability” of loss, occurrence of a “loss event” and the uncertain
amount of losses that would be expected, managers can exercise discretion on the amount
of provisions may, which may or may not accurately reflect the credit risk in the loan
portfolio. I separate the managerial accounting decisions into two components in line with
Bushman (2014), namely the accounting number which has a direct impact on a firms’
operations and the signaling effect of the accounting number. In essence, I assume that
LLPs consist of two distinct components, namely a non-discretionary (direct impact),
and a discretionary component (signaling).
I examine the differential impact of total LLPs, and the various components of LLPs
on deposit rates. I separate LLPs into a non-discretionary component (L̂LP ) which re-
flects the credit risk in the loan portfolio, and a discretionary (L̃LP ) component that
signals managements’ private information. To compute the non-discretionary and discre-
tionary components of LLPs, I estimate models for LLPs based on prior literature. The
fitted values from the model represent the non-discretionary component (L̂LP ), while
the residuals from the model are the discretionary components (L̃LP ) of LLPs.
Unlike discretionary accrual models for non-financial firms which have some degree of
consensus (Beatty and Liao, 2014), provision models for banks seem to capture varying
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features of managerial decisions depending on the period under study, economic environ-
ment, and the econometric approach used (Balboa et al., 2013). In addition to revealing
managements’ private information on loan quality, prior studies show that loan loss pro-
visions are also used to smooth earnings and manage capital. Studies relating LLPs and
capital management in the pre-BASEL regime,15 such as Beatty, Chamberlain, et al.
(1995); Collins et al. (1995); and Moyer (1990) find a negative relationship between LLPs
and regulatory capital levels, indicating that banks with low levels of regulatory capital,
could increase capital by increasing LLP’s. In the post-BASEL regime, Ahmed, Takeda,
et al. (1999) use the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA)
of 1991 to study capital and earnings management via loan loss provisions. The FDICIA
separated total regulatory capital into Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, with minimum risk-based
capital ratios to be maintained at all times.16 They find that while managers actively use
LLPs to manage regulatory capital ratios, that is banks with lower regulatory capital use
LLPs to improve their capital ratios, they however, do not find any evidence of earnings
management.
In comparison, (Ma (1988); Collins et al. (1995); Bhat (1996)) find support for earn-
ings management via LLPs. Kanagaretnam, Lobo, et al. (2004) jointly test for signaling
private information and earnings management via LLPs in different capital/valuation
environments and find evidence that banks that have low or high current performance
compared to peers, and where the managers are optimistic about future performance
have incentives to engage on both income smoothing and signaling private information
via LLPs.
My model to assess managements’ ex-ante ability to estimate future losses on the
loan portfolio incorporates explanatory variables from a variety of existing models. I
include current values of charge-offs (Beaver and Engel (1996); Beck and Narayanamoor-
15Prior to 1990, the full amount of Allowance for Lease and Loan Losses (ALLL) was included as part
of regulatory capital.
16To be classified as “Well Capitalized”, banks must maintain minimum Tier 1 Risk Based Capital
Ratio of 8%, Total Risk Based Capital Ratio of 10%, and Tier 1 Leverage Ratio of 5%. In addition, Tier
2 capital cannot exceed Tier 1 capital
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thy (2013)) as high charge-offs in one period will deplete the ALLL reserve which will
need to be replenished via LLPs. I include current and lagged values of changes in loans
outstanding (Beaver and Engel (1996); Kim and Kross (1998); Kanagaretnam, Krishnan,
et al. (2010)), as extending greater amounts of credit increases the possibility of higher
losses in the future. Including current and lagged values; of changes in non-performing
loans (Bushman and Williams, 2012) accounts for the possibility that banks may rely
on past information on non-performing loans to estimate loan losses in the future. I
also include lagged values of ALLL (Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, et al. (2010); Beck and
Narayanamoorthy (2013); Wahlen (1994); Collins et al. (1995); Beatty, Chamberlain,
et al. (1995)) to control for the total amount of reserve banks hold against losses, high
reserve levels in the past may warrant lower levels of provisions going forward.
I also include macroeconomic variables such as changes in unemployment rate and
return on the case shiller home price index (Beck and Narayanamoorthy, 2013), and GDP
growth rate (Bushman and Williams, 2012). I also include lagged values of Tier 1 risk
based capital ratio (Tier 1 RBCR) (Balboa et al., 2013), and current values of earnings
before provisions and taxes (EBTP) (Kanagaretnam, Krishnan, et al. (2010); Ahmed,
Takeda, et al. (1999)). In addition to reported accounting data and macro economic
variables, I also include a dummy variable for the federal regulator of the bank since the
levels of scrutiny in loan loss provisions varies among regulators (Nicoletti, 2016). For
national banks, the federal regulator is the OCC, for state member banks it is the Federal
Reserve and for state non-member banks, it is the FDIC. I control for bank fixed effects
in all the models.
I estimate the following model, and use fitted values from the model as the non-
discretionary component (L̂LP ) and residuals (εit) as the discretionary component (L̃LP ).
LLPit = αi + β1COit + β2∆Loanit + β3∆Loanit−1 + β4∆NPAit+1 + β5∆NPAit
+ β6∆NPAit−1 + β7∆NPAit−2 + β7Sizeit−1 + β8ALWit−1 + β9Regulatorit
+ β10CSHI_Rett + β11Unemp_Changet + β12GDP_Growtht + εit
(2)
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LLP is the loan loss provisions scaled by lagged loans, CO is the net charge-off’s
scaled by lagged loans , ∆Loan is the changes in loans scaled by total assets, ∆NPA
is the changes in non-performing loans scaled by lagged loans, ALW is the allowance
for lease and loan loss scaled by total loans, Regulator is the primary federal regula-
tor17, Size is the log of total assets, CSHI_Ret is the return on the Case-Shiller Index,
Unemp_Change is the change in the unemployment rate, and GDP_Growth is the
GDP growth rate.
I then use the total, non-discretionary LLPs (L̂LP ), and discretionary LLP’s (L̃LP )
separately to estimate their effect on deposit rates under various financial reporting en-
vironments. The model I estimate is:
rijt = αi + γθt + βLLPi,t−1 ∗ Zi,t−1 + ηit (3)
Where rijt is the deposit rate for bank i, product j, at time t; αi are bank fixed effects,
θt is the federal funds rate for time period t, and Zi,t−1 is the timeliness in reporting
provisions. The models are estimated separately for banks that have a publicly listed
Bank Holding Company (BHC) and banks that don’t. The incremental information on
bank health from its financial reporting environment is discussed next.
Financial Reporting Environment
In addition to the information on loan loss provisions available in the quarterly financial
reports, timeliness in provisioning can provide depositors additional information on the
health of the bank. Timeliness in provisioning is computed as lower values of Delayed
Expected Loss Recognition (DELR), where DELR is computed as the incremental R2
impact of including changes in current and future non-performing loans in explaining
LLPs (Nichols et al., 2009). Higher incremental R2 indicates low DELR or high timeliness.
Prior literature shows timeliness in loss recognition to be associated with banks’ lending
behavior (Beatty and Liao, 2011), and riskiness (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003).
17The primary federal regulator is the OCC for banks with National charter, The Federal Reserve for
State Member banks, and FDIC for State Non-Member banks.
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Additionally the model specified on equation 3 is estimated separately for banks with,
and without a public BHC. As a publicly listed company, in addition to the call reports the
bank files with its regulator, the parent company is also required to file quarterly reports
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As these reports filed with the
SEC are much more detailed than call reports, it would add to the information available
to depositors of these banks, compared to those that do not file with the SEC. (Holod
and Peek, 2007) show a reduction in the information asymmetry for publicly listed firms
compared to private firms.
Non-Discretionary Provisions
I further study only the effect of non-discretionary LLPs (L̂LP ) under various perfor-
mance, accounting conservatism, and loan portfolio characteristics. All performance/accounting
conservatism, and loan portfolio characteristics are explained in subsequent sections. The
model I estimate is:
rijt = αi + γθt + βL̂LP i,t−1 ∗ Zi,t−1 + ηit (4)
Where rijt is the deposit rate for bank i, product j, at time t; αi are bank fixed effects,
θt is the federal funds rate for the time period t, L̂LP are the non-discretionary provi-
sions, and Zi,t−1 are the various performance, accounting conservatism, and loan portfolio
characteristics. These characteristics are described below.
Detailed definitions of the variables used in the regression models are given in Table
A. For performance measures I use the banks’ total loan growth and its Earnings before
Taxes and Provisions (EBTP). Loan growth is computed over a one-year period, while
EBTP is the 4-quarter moving average. Both the variables are dummies, which have a
value of 1 if they are above the median value for that quarter, and 0 otherwise.
For accounting conservatism, I use two measures, namely conservatism in Allowance
for Lease and Loan Losses (ALLL), and conservatism in Charge-Offs (CO). Conservatism
in ALLL is Computed as the rank of the distance between 4-quarter moving average
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ALLL measure for each bank and the median value during that quarter. ALLL measure
is computed as the ratio of ALLL/ NPAs. ALLL conservatism is a dummy variable
which takes the value of 1 if ALLL is above the median value for that quarter, and 0
otherwise. Conservatism in Charge-Offs (CO) is computed as the rank of the distance
between 4-quarter moving average CO measure for each bank and the median value
during that quarter. The CO measure is computed as the ratio Charge-Offs / NPAs.
CO conservatism is also a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if CO is above the
median value for that quarter, and 0 otherwise
I use four measures for loan portfolio characteristics, namely loan concentration HHI,
and growth rates in Commercial Real Estate (CRE), Commercial & Industrial (C&I),
and Consumer loans. Loan concentration HHI is computed as the Herfindahl-Hirschman
index (HHI) across five loan categories, namely CRE loans, C&I loans, Consumer loans,
Agricultural loans, and Farmland loans. Loan HHI is the 4-quarter moving average, while
growth rates are for a 1 year period. All measures are converted into dummy variables,
which have a value of 1 if they are above the median value for that quarter, and 0
otherwise.
Economic Capital
The Allowance for Lease and Loan Losses (ALLL) reserve is a contra-asset, and loans
are reported net of this adjustment on the balance sheet. LLP’s and loan recoveries
contribute to this reserve while charge-offs deplete this reserve. By definition:
ALLLt = ALLLt−1 + LLPt +Recoveriest − Charge-Offst.
The ALLL reserve is an important determinant of both regulatory capital and the safety
buffer a bank has. ALLL up to 1.25% of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) is considered part
of Tier 2 capital and contributes to total regulatory capital. ALLL above this limit does
not contribute to regulatory capital but acts as a buffer against which realized loan losses
are recognized, thereby protecting erosion of regulatory capital. I define ALLL amounts
in excess to those contributing to Tier 2 Capital as “Economic Capital”. Additions to
Economic Capital is a dummy variable that takes value 1 when ALLLt ≥ 1.25% RWAt.
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The decision to provision or not directly affects the total buffer (regulatory capital
+ economic capital) a banks has. For example, a bank has Earnings Before Taxes and
Provisions (EBTP) of $100 and a tax rate (T)of 40%. If a bank makes no provisions,
then $60 (EBTP*(1-T)), is added to Tier 1 capital via retained earnings and total buffer
increases by $60. If however the bank makes $100 in provisions, $100 gets added to the
ALLL reserve, either partly or wholly as Tier 2 capital and the remaining as economic
capital, but the total buffer now increases by $100. Correspondingly, whether LLPs
contribute to regulatory capital, or to the safety buffer can be informative to depositors.
To examine the effect on deposit rates when total, non-discretionary, and discretionary
provisions add to economic capital, I estimate the following model:
rijt = αi + γθt + βLLPi,t−1 ∗ Zi,t−1 + ηit (5)
Where Zi,t−1 is the Economic Capital Add dummy, as defined earlier, and LLP is
total, non-discretionary (L̂LP ), and discretionary provisions (L̃LP ).
2.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
This study employs deposit rate data from RateWatch, bank fundamentals from the
Reports of Condition and Income (“Call Reports”), and the Federal Funds Rate from the
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis.
RateWatch provides weekly deposit rate data at the branch level for banks, credit
unions, savings & loan organizations, among others on a multitude of of products in-
cluding savings and checking accounts, money market deposit accounts (MMDA’s), and
certificates of deposit (CD’s) for maturities ranging from 3-months to 60-months. My to-
tal sample consists of weekly deposit rate data from 75,492 branches spread across 6,658
banks from Jan, 2002 - March, 2014.
I use deposit rates of CD’s for $100K accounts for the time period up to December
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2008, starting January 2009 I use rates for $250K accounts. I choose the highest denomi-
nation CD’s, as large time deposits in addition to being non-core and consequently having
little-to-no relationship with the bank, are largely from sophisticated investors and cor-
porations, and would be most sensitive to changes in bank risk. All weekly deposit rates
are averaged for the quarter for each bank to ensure compatibility with the Call report
data, which is at the quarterly level. Average quarterly rates for 12-month and 60-month
CD’s, and the Fed Funds Rate from 2001 - 2014 are plotted in Figure 5 and summary
statistics for deposit rates and bank fundamentals used in the analysis are given in Table
11.
While branches of failed banks that were not acquired by any other institution are not
included in the sample, branches that were acquired as a result of merger are included in
the dataset, and their deposit rate data is reported as always belonging to the acquiring
institution. To adjust for mergers, I obtain the history of branch ownership change from
RateWatch and match each branch to their owner prior to the merger. This branch
change history is only available starting 2007. To adjust for mergers prior to that I
simply leave out the acquiring bank that was involved in a merger.
I obtain bank fundamental data from the Call reports which all banks file with their
respective regulatory authorities. Call reports are available in machine readable format
from the Chicago Fed website18. I restrict my sample to commercial banks to ensure
uniformity in business practices, and exclude banks with Total Assets < $25 million. I
also exclude Too Big To Fail (TBTF) banks for the 2007-2008 financial crisis period19
. Implicit government guarantees could have affected both the deposit rates at these
banks, and increased regulatory scrutiny could have affected their loan loss provisioning
behavior, which could distort my results.
Deposit rate data is matched to bank fundamental data using the “RSSD ID”, which
is a unique identifier for each bank. Banks for which the “RSSD ID” is not available in
18https://www.chicagofed.org/banking/financial-institution-reports/commercial-bank-data
19Includes Bank of America Corp., Goldman Sachs Group, Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Chase
Manhattan Corp., State Street Boston Corp., Citigroup Inc., Northwest Bancorporation
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the deposit rates data are removed from the sample20. My final sample consists of both
deposit rate and bank fundamental data for 5,378 unique banks, though not all banks
offer all the products for the entire sample period.
Descriptive Statistics: Deposit Rates
Figure 5 shows the plots for the deposit rates on $100K CD’s for 12 and 60 month CD’s
and the Federal Funds Rate for the time period 2001 - 2014 and Table 11 shows the
summary statistics for the deposit rates for the given time periods. It can be seen that
the deposit rates for CD’s move in close alignment with the Federal Funds Rate. It can
be seen that on average, across time periods, deposit rates on CD’s are above the Federal
Funds Rate, implying the existence of a premium over and above the base rate.
It can be seen that the average Federal Funds Rate rose from 2.76% during the 2002-
2006 period to 3.04% during 2007-2008, before falling to 0.12% after the crisis. Deposit
rates on $100K 12-month CD’s rose from 2.85% in 2002-2006 period to 3.18% for to the
2007-2008 period. In contrast deposit rates on $100K 60-month CD’s fell from an average
of 3.83% in the 2002-2006 period to 3.63% during 2007-2008 period. Post-crisis, average
deposit rates for $250K accounts for 12-month and 60-month CD’s were 0.59% and 1.36%
respectively, well above the average fed funds rate of 0.12%.
20Banks for which the RSSD ID is not available, also have missing values for CERT ID, which is a



















Deposit Rates for $100K CD's
Figure 5. CD Rates and Fed Funds Rates
Note: Figure 5 shows the average quarterly deposit rates on $100K CD accounts for 12
and 60 month CD’s, and the average quarterly federal funds rate. We see that on average
prior to and after the crisis the federal funds rate was lower than the rate offered on
12-month and 60-month Certificates of Deposit Accounts. During the crisis we see the
federal funds rate was higher. The average federal funds rate is lower in the summary
statistics during the crisis period as the drop in the rate was sharper than the drop in
12-month and 60-month CD rates.Broadly, we see that deposit rates and the federal funds
rate seem to be highly correlated to one another.
Descriptive Statistics: Bank Fundamentals
Table 11 shows the summary statistics for Loan loss provisions, Allowance for Lease and
Loan Losses (ALLL), and Charge-Offs (CO), in addition to various dummy variables
used in the study. It can be seen that ALLL and CO have been on a consistent decline
during the period. ALLL declined from 4.61x NPA prior to the crisis, to 2.68x during
the crisis, eventually to 1.34x post-crisis. Similarly CO declined from 9.7% of NPA to
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Table 11. Summary Statistics - Deposit Rates and Bank Fundamentals
Variables N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Q1,2002 - Q4,2006
Avg. Quarterly Fed Funds Rate 12,836 2.761 1.599 0.980 5.250
Avg. Quarterly Deposit Rate (12M CD) 12,836 2.846 1.208 0.322 5.133
Avg. Quarterly Deposit Rate (60M CD) 3,029 3.830 0.729 1.570 5.133
ACLA 12,769 0.010 0.013 0.000 0.188
LLP 12,769 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.005
CO 11,665 0.097 0.165 −0.125 0.974
Log (Total Assets) 12,836 12.206 1.118 10.133 17.773
ALLL 11,665 4.617 7.215 0.381 41.353
EBTP 12,769 0.007 0.052 −5.762 0.370
Dummy Variables
Econ. Capital Add 12,836 0.350 0.477 0 1
Public BHC 12,836 0.112 0.316 0 1
Size > $10bn 12,836 0.007 0.083 0 1
Q1,2007 - Q4,2008
Avg. Quarterly Fed Funds Rate 8,397 3.047 1.780 0.160 5.260
Avg. Quarterly Deposit Rate (12M CD) 8,397 3.182 1.004 0.262 5.070
Avg. Quarterly Deposit Rate (60M CD) 1,880 3.633 0.781 1.077 5.070
ACLA 8,365 0.018 0.024 0.000 0.329
LLP 8,365 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.015
CO 7,686 0.071 0.116 −0.081 0.614
Log (Total Assets) 8,397 12.363 1.105 10.150 18.703
ALLL 7,686 2.685 4.494 0.200 27.240
EBTP 8,365 0.003 0.167 −15.222 0.167
Dummy Variables
Econ. Capital Add 8,397 0.312 0.463 0 1
Public BHC 8,397 0.107 0.309 0 1
Size > $10bn 8,397 0.007 0.084 0 1
Q1,2009 - Q1,2014
Avg. Quarterly Fed Funds Rate 57,956 0.118 0.036 0.070 0.210
Avg. Quarterly Deposit Rate (12M CD) 57,956 0.559 0.268 0.050 2.500
Avg. Quarterly Deposit Rate (60M CD) 44,526 1.365 0.388 0.050 2.855
ACLA 57,911 0.040 0.054 0.000 0.902
LLP 57,911 0.001 0.002 −0.001 0.021
CO 55,984 0.042 0.071 −0.039 0.375
Log (Total Assets) 57,956 12.048 1.013 10.127 18.547
ALLL 55,984 1.340 1.775 0.152 9.875
EBTP 57,911 0.005 0.008 −0.638 0.410
Dummy Variables
Econ. Capital Add 57,956 0.659 0.474 0 1
Public BHC 57,956 0.048 0.213 0 1
Size > $10bn 57,956 0.007 0.059 0 1
Note: Table 11 shows the summary statistics for the variables used in the main model for
deposit rates. Data on deposit rates was obtained from RateWatch, Fed Funds Rate was
obtained from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website, and all fundamental bank vari-
ables were obtained from the Reports of Condition and Income (“Call Reports”). Deposit
rates for CD’s are for $100K accounts till Q4,2008 and for $250K accounts thereafter. All
variables have been winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentile.
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7% during the crisis, and eventually to 4.2% of NPA post-crisis. This consistent decline
in ALLL and CO ratios can be explained in part by a monotonic increase in the total
amount of Non-Performing Assets (ACLA in the summary table) as percentage of loans.
Non-Performing Assets (NPA’s) as percentage of Total Loans increased from 1% prior to
the crisis, to 1.8% during the crisis, and 4% post crisis. The percentage of bank-quarters,
where banks’ ALLL was in excess of its regulatory Tier 2 capital has increased from 35%
prior to the crisis to 66% post crisis.
2.5 Results
Tables 12 to 13 show the results for the various hypotheses being tested. I place a caveat
here, that given the “near-zero” federal funds and deposit rates in the period beginning
2009, one must exercise caution in the interpretation of these results. Due to both the
low levels and low variability in deposit rates, a low R2 is a mechanical effect, and does
not reflect on the goodness-of-fit of the models being estimated.
Loan Loss Provisions and Financial Reporting
Tables 12 and 13 show the effect of loan loss provisions, timeliness in reporting these
provisions, and the effects of non-discretionary and discretionary provisions, for public
and non-public BHC’s, on deposit rates. We see that LLPs are positively associated
with higher deposit rates. This effect is consistent during and after the crisis, for both
the 12-month and 60-month CD’s. Post-crisis, the average quarterly rate on 12-month
CD’s increases by 0.29-0.44 percentage points, and the average quarterly rate for 60-
month CD’s increases by 0.55-0.91 percentage points, for a 1 percentage point increase in
LLPs. While LLPs by themselves are associated with higher deposit rates, higher LLPs in
combination with timely reporting of these provisions is viewed favorably by depositors,
leading to lower deposit rates, though the effect is more evident in the post-crisis period,
and for banks with publicly listed BHC’s. Post-crisis, increases in LLPs accompanied with
timeliness lowers deposit rates by 0.02-0.14 percentage points for 12-month CDs, and by
0.05-0.18 percentage points for 60-month CDs. We also see that while non-discretionary
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provisions are consistently and positively associated with higher deposit rates, the effect
of discretionary provisions is ambiguous and inconsistent. Post-crisis, a percentage point
increase in non-discretionary provisions increases deposit rates by 0.61-0.71 percentage
points for 12-month CDs, and by 1.18-1.41 percentage points for 60-month CDs.
These findings suggest that in addition to information garnered from accounting in-
formation in regulatory financial reports, the additional information obtained from SEC
filings by publicly listed BHCs increases the sensitivity of deposit rates to bank specific
information. It also suggests that depositors price the direct impact of accounting num-
bers on banks’ fundamentals into deposit rates, while the signaling effect is not priced.
This is in contrast to prior studies that found that both non-discretionary and discre-
tionary components of LLPs are priced by equity markets (Beaver and Venkatachalam,
1999). Henceforth, in the remaining results and corresponding tables I only consider
the non-discretionary component of LLPs in my analysis, except when analyzing the ef-
fect of LLPs when they add to economic capital, I consider total, non-discretionary, and
discretionary LLPs.
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Table 12. Loan Loss Provisions, Financial Reporting Environment, and Deposit Rates (12-Month CD’s)
Dependent variable: Average Quarterly Deposit Rate rijt
Public BHC
Q1,2002 - Q4,2006 (CD 100K) Q1,2007 - Q4,2008 (CD 100K) Q1,2009 - Q1,2014 (CD 250K)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LLP −0.365∗∗ −0.400∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.106∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.174) (0.059) (0.062) (0.032) (0.045)
LLP*Timeliness 0.411 0.023 −0.144∗∗∗
(0.300) (0.089) (0.051)
L̂LP 0.228 0.288∗∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗
(0.254) (0.077) (0.052)
L̃LP −0.706∗∗∗ −0.091 0.115
(0.200) (0.084) (0.280)
Observations 3,405 3,405 3,388 1,929 1,929 1,924 4,781 4,781 4,685
R2 0.893 0.895 0.894 0.788 0.788 0.789 0.206 0.213 0.270
Non-Public BHC
LLP 0.022 0.030 0.249∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.065) (0.026) (0.031) (0.006) (0.008)
LLP*Timeliness −0.032 −0.022 −0.023∗∗
(0.129) (0.043) (0.010)
L̂LP 0.233∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.034) (0.010)
L̃LP −0.070 0.056 0.007
(0.068) (0.037) (0.008)
Observations 13,610 13,610 13,463 8,738 8,738 8,644 59,956 59,956 59,397
R2 0.896 0.896 0.896 0.819 0.819 0.820 0.116 0.116 0.196
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fed. Funds Rate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 13. Loan Loss Provisions, Financial Reporting Environment, and Deposit Rates (60-Month CD’s)
Dependent variable: Average Quarterly Deposit Rate rijt
Q1,2002 - Q4,2006 (CD 100K) Q1,2007 - Q4,2008 (CD 100K) Q1,2009 - Q1,2014 (CD 250K)
Public BHC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LLP 0.104∗∗∗ 0.161 0.106∗ 0.059∗ 0.832∗∗∗ 0.915∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.219) (0.061) (0.033) (0.058) (0.077)
LLP*Timeliness −0.328∗∗∗ 0.099 −0.180∗∗
(0.036) (0.094) (0.081)
L̂LP 0.707∗ 0.120∗ 1.412∗∗∗
(0.390) (0.069) (0.081)
L̃LP −0.226 0.072 0.383∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.115) (0.068)
Observations 1,669 1,669 1,662 848 848 847 4,191 4,191 4,105
R2 0.692 0.693 0.694 0.718 0.718 0.718 0.222 0.225 0.270
Non-Public BHC
LLP 0.130 0.154 0.257∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.108) (0.058) (0.071) (0.011) (0.015)
LLP*Timeliness −0.113 −0.097 −0.056∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.091) (0.020)
L̂LP 0.215 0.419∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.059) (0.018)
L̃LP 0.059 0.047 0.026
(0.105) (0.097) (0.017)
Observations 3,198 3,198 3,167 1,924 1,924 1,912 46,076 46,076 45,631
R2 0.767 0.767 0.768 0.729 0.730 0.732 0.120 0.120 0.212
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fed. Funds Rate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Non-Discretionary Provisions, Operating Performance, and Accounting Conservatism
Table 14 shows the effect of non-discretionary provisions under various bank performance
and accounting conservatism environments, on deposit rates. Consistent with previous
results, I find that ceteris paribus, non-discretionary provisions are positively associated
with higher deposit rates, and these results are consistent for both 12-month and 60-
month CD’s. Higher non-discretionary provisions at banks facing higher loan growth is
associated with higher deposit rates. This is consistent with prior studies which have
shown that high loan growth has been associated with increased riskiness in the loan
portfolio (Foos et al. (2010); Jin et al. (2011)). This suggests that high loan growth
could possibly have been achieved by lowered credit standards, and in due time these
loans have started to go bad, resulting in increased non-discretionary provisions. To
compensate for this increase in loan portfolio risk, banks have to pay an increased risk
premium to depositors, resulting in increased deposit rates.
One would expect to see banks with higher past earnings to be viewed favorably by
deposit holders, and we see the result as expect for the periods leading up to, and through
the crisis. Higher non-discretionary provisions accompanied by higher earnings lead to
lower deposit rates. Post-crisis however, this effect seems to have reversed, and higher
non-discretionary provisions accompanies by higher earnings leads to higher deposit rates.
A possible explanation could be that depositors perceive that the past levels of higher
earnings were achieved on the basis of a risky loan portfolio, which is now beginning
to show signs of deterioration, hence depositors view this adversely. Another possible
explanation is given by Graham et al. (2005), who suggest that managers tend to delay
bad news in the hope that subsequent events will turn in their favor. These findings
suggest that depositors can infer the “bad news” in non-discretionary provisions and
possibly weigh it more than the “good news” suggested by earnings.
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Table 14. Non-Discretionary Provisions, Bank Performance and Accounting Conservatism, and Deposit Rates
Dependent variable: Average Quarterly Deposit Rate rijt
Q1,2002 - Q4,2006 (12M CD 100K) Q1,2007 - Q4,2008 (12M CD 100K) Q1,2009 - Q1,2014 (12M CD 250K)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
L̂LP 0.135 0.435∗∗ 0.125 0.552∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.584∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗ 0.871∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.178) (0.141) (0.196) (0.045) (0.043) (0.041) (0.068) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.019)
L̂LP ∗ Loan Growth 0.071 0.047∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.026) (0.019)
L̂LP ∗ Earnings −0.439∗∗ −0.028 0.159∗∗∗
(0.210) (0.065) (0.019)
L̂LP ∗ALLL Conservatism 0.212 −0.079 0.219∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.067) (0.023)
L̂LP ∗ CO Conservatism −0.455∗∗ −0.268∗∗∗ −0.295∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.071) (0.020)
Observations 12,622 12,622 12,622 12,622 8,268 8,268 8,268 8,268 57,318 57,318 57,318 57,318
R2 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.812 0.812 0.813 0.813 0.197 0.194 0.196 0.209
Q1,2002 - Q4,2006 (60M CD 100K) Q1,2007 - Q4,2008 (60M CD 100K) Q1,2009 - Q1,2014 (60M CD 250K)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
L̂LP 0.597∗∗ 0.632∗∗ 0.435∗ 1.107∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.443∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗ 1.059∗∗∗ 1.075∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗ 1.590∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.277) (0.255) (0.339) (0.070) (0.069) (0.068) (0.138) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.036)
L̂LP ∗ Loan Growth −0.348 0.062∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.012) (0.035)
L̂LP ∗ Earnings −0.325 −0.016 0.285∗∗∗
(0.320) (0.093) (0.038)
L̂LP ∗ALLL Conservatism 0.020 −0.323 0.442∗∗∗
(0.393) (0.197) (0.045)
L̂LP ∗ CO Conservatism −0.841∗∗ 0.001 −0.536∗∗∗
(0.357) (0.144) (0.037)
Observations 2,988 2,988 2,988 2,988 1,863 1,863 1,863 1,863 44,017 44,017 44,017 44,017
R2 0.777 0.777 0.776 0.777 0.723 0.723 0.724 0.723 0.210 0.207 0.210 0.225
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fed. Funds Rate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Prior literature suggests that overall conservatism in accounting leads to lower cost
of debt for firms (Ahmed, Billings, et al., 2002). To assess the effect of accounting
conservatism on deposit rates, I examine the effect of non-discretionary provisions, in
conjunction with banks’ past conservatism in reporting of Allowance for Lease and Loan
Losses (ALLL) and Charge-Offs (CO). I find that conservatism in accounting for ALLL
leads to higher deposit rates, and this effect is only pronounced post-crisis. On the other
hand, conservatism in accounting for CO leads to lower deposit rates, and this effect is
present pre, during, and post-crisis periods. Conservatism in ALLL, that is maintaining a
high level of Loan Loss Reserve as a percentage of Total Loans could possibly indicate an
increased riskiness in the banks activities going forward. Loan Loss Reserve contributes
to Tier 2 regulatory capital (upto 1.25% of Risk Weighted Assets), which could enable
banks to increase the risk of their loan portfolio. Ng and Roychowdhury (2014) find that
during the financial crisis banks used this Tier 2 capital to take on excessive risks, which
eventually contributed to bank failures. Conservatism in CO, that is a having higher levels
of Charge-Offs as percentage of Non-Performing Assets, could indicate banks’ intentions
in dealing with troubled loans in a timely manner so as not to create an overhang problem
going forward.
Non-Discretionary Provisions and Loan Portfolio Characteristics
Table 15 shows the effect of non-discretionary provisions on deposit rates for various
loan portfolio characteristics. We saw previously that higher levels of non-discretionary
provisions in conjunction with high loan growth is perceived negatively by depositors
and leads to higher deposit rates. I next examine how non-discretionary provisions in
conjunction with loan portfolio characteristics such as loan concentration levels, and loan
growth in individual categories affects deposit rates.
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Table 15. Non-Discretionary Provisions, Loan Portfolio Characteristics, and Deposit Rates
Dependent variable: Average Quarterly Deposit Rate rijt
Q1,2002 - Q4,2006 (12M CD 100K) Q1,2007 - Q4,2008 (12M CD 100K) Q1,2009 - Q1,2014 (12M CD 250K)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
L̂LP 0.875∗∗ 0.156 0.004 0.182 0.736∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.981∗∗∗ 0.594∗∗∗ 0.598∗∗∗ 0.626∗∗∗
(0.413) (0.139) (0.137) (0.127) (0.129) (0.042) (0.046) (0.042) (0.031) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
L̂LP ∗ Loan Concentration −1.460∗ −0.666∗∗∗ −0.647∗∗∗
(0.867) (0.233) (0.054)
L̂LP ∗ CRE Loan Growth 0.062 −0.067 0.115∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.063) (0.016)
L̂LP ∗ C&I Loan Growth 0.449∗∗∗ −0.028 0.110∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.059) (0.016)
L̂LP ∗ Cons. Loan Growth 0.007 0.043 0.039∗∗
(0.172) (0.058) (0.016)
Observations 12,622 12,622 12,622 12,622 8,268 8,268 8,268 8,268 57,318 57,318 57,318 57,318
R2 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.813 0.812 0.813 0.812 0.196 0.193 0.194 0.191
Q1,2002 - Q4,2006 (60M CD 100K) Q1,2007 - Q4,2008 (60M CD 100K) Q1,2009 - Q1,2014 (60M CD 250K)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
L̂LP 0.685 0.775∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗ 0.553∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 1.696∗∗∗ 1.077∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 1.143∗∗∗
(0.833) (0.232) (0.227) (0.218) (0.222) (0.070) (0.073) (0.065) (0.061) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
L̂LP ∗ Loan Concentration −0.485 −0.606 −0.973∗∗∗
(1.644) (0.370) (0.105)
L̂LP ∗ CRE Loan Growth −0.651∗∗ −0.193∗ 0.244∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.111) (0.030)
L̂LP ∗ C&I Loan Growth −0.185 0.021 0.243∗∗∗
(0.269) (0.102) (0.029)
L̂LP ∗ Cons. Loan Growth −0.239 0.127 0.089∗∗∗
(0.323) (0.107) (0.029)
Observations 2,988 2,988 2,988 2,988 1,863 1,863 1,863 1,863 44,017 44,017 44,017 44,017
R2 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.723 0.723 0.723 0.723 0.208 0.207 0.207 0.205
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fed. Funds Rate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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I find that non-discretionary provisions accompanied by higher loan concentration
levels leads to lower deposit rates. This could possibly suggest that higher loan concen-
tration levels are viewed by depositors as indications of a banks’ expertise in lending to
certain sectors. Additionally, managements’ ability and willingness to recognize losses
based on their expertise is viewed positively by depositors.
For loan growth within individual categories, we see that for Commercial Real Estate
(CRE) loans, in the period leading up to and into the crisis, managements ability to
identify and recognize losses was viewed favorably by depositors. This effect has however
reversed since, and is consistent across the 12-month and 60-month CD’s. For both
Commercial & Industrial (C&I) and Consumer loans, we see that higher non-discretionary
provisions accompanied with high levels of loan growth lead to higher deposit rates,
the results being consistent for both the 12-month and 60-month CD’s, in the post-
crisis period. These findings suggest that both high levels of overall loan growth and
loan growth within individual categories, when accompanied by higher levels of non-
discretionary provisions is perceived as increased riskiness by depositors, which leads to
higher deposit rates.
Loan Loss Provisions and Additions to Economic Capital
We have seen consistent evidence that both total and non-discretionary loan loss pro-
visions are consistently and positively associated with higher deposit rates in general.
However, depending on the circumstances they can be viewed as either reflecting the
riskiness in the loan portfolio leading to higher deposit rates, or the banks’ ability to
recognize and absorb these losses leading to lower deposit rates. Table 16 shows the ef-
fect of total, non-discretionary and discretionary components when they add to economic
capital.
Loan Loss Provisions (LLPs) directly add to the Allowance for Lease and Loan Losses
(ALLL) which is a contra-asset on the banks’ balance sheet. In the event a loan is
written off as unrecoverable, a Charge-Off of the loan is created which depletes the ALLL
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reserve. ALLL up to 1.25% of Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) is considered as part of a
banks’ Tier 2 regulatory capital. ALLL reserves in excess of Tier 2 regulatory capital is
considered Economic Capital as it provides additional reserves to the bank against which
loan defaults can be written off and increases the long term solvency of the bank.
We see that for both total and non-discretionary components, additions to economic
capital are viewed favorably by depositors, and leads to lower deposit rates, however,
the additions of discretionary provisions to economic capital has the opposite effect, and
leads to higher deposit rates. A possible explanation for this could be that increases in
credit risk in the loan portfolio, as reflected by total and non-discretionary LLP’s, when
accompanied by an increase in the total safety buffer of the bank is viewed favorably by
depositors, but increases in discretionary provisions is viewed as opportunistic behavior
by the management, and hence subsequently penalized.
These findings suggest that depositors, especially the partially uninsured ones, do
price a banks’ insolvency risk, as they would lose their deposits in case of a bank failure.
Changes in deposit rates reflects a disciplining mechanism employed by depositors.
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Table 16. Loan Loss Provisions, Additions to Economic Capital, and Deposit Rates
Dependent variable: Average Quarterly Deposit Rate rijt
Q1,2002 - Q4,2006 (12M CD 100K) Q1,2007 - Q4,2008 (12M CD 100K) Q1,2009 - Q1,2014 (12M CD 250K)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LLP −0.041 0.146∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.056) (0.017)
L̂LP 0.241 0.343∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.061) (0.025)
L̃LP −0.192∗∗ −0.112 −0.414∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.072) (0.034)
Econ. Capital Add −0.037 −0.009 −0.031 0.045∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.030) (0.022) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
LLP*Econ. Capital Add 0.027 0.081 −0.088∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.060) (0.018)
L̂LP ∗ Econ. Capital Add −0.232∗ 0.056 −0.337∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.067) (0.027)
L̃LP ∗ Econ. Capital Add 0.199 0.163∗ 0.486∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.093) (0.035)
Observations 12,769 12,622 12,622 8,365 8,268 8,268 57,911 57,318 57,318
R2 0.898 0.898 0.898 0.812 0.813 0.810 0.116 0.203 0.064
Q1,2002 - Q4,2006 (60M CD 100K) Q1,2007 - Q4,2008 (60M CD 100K) Q1,2009 - Q1,2014 (60M CD 250K)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
LLP −0.057 0.178 0.694∗∗∗
(0.126) (0.110) (0.034)
L̂LP 0.486∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 1.677∗∗∗
(0.261) (0.104) (0.046)
L̃LP −0.328∗∗ −0.236 −0.743∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.160) (0.069)
Econ. Capital Add −0.028 0.026 0.014 0.052 0.111∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.045) (0.036) (0.041) (0.041) (0.036) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
LLP*Econ. Capital Add 0.374∗∗ 0.064 −0.173∗∗∗
(0.190) (0.111) (0.036)
L̂LP ∗ Econ. Capital Add −0.035 −0.051 −0.576∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.109) (0.049)
L̃LP ∗ Econ. Capital Add 0.675∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.217) (0.070)
Observations 3,016 2,988 2,988 1,876 1,863 1,863 44,494 44,017 44,017
R2 0.776 0.777 0.777 0.723 0.724 0.721 0.120 0.218 0.053
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fed. Funds Rate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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2.6 Conclusion
Using branch level deposit rate data I examine the effect of accounting information in
financial reports on deposit rates. I use deposit rates for partially insured certificates of
deposits (CD’s) which are most sensitive to the accounting information provided in bank
financial reports. I primarily look at how loan loss provisions (both non-discretionary
and discretionary) affect deposit rates. I find that overall depositors react more to the
direct impact of accounting information on bank profitability and solvency rather than
the signaling effect of accounting information observed in the equity and debt markets. I
find that higher provisions lead to higher deposit rates, however timeliness in provisioning
leads to lower rates. I also find that higher provisions accompanied with high loan growth
and high earnings lead to higher deposit rates. Accounting conservatism on the other hand
has mixed effects. Conservatism in Allowance for Lease and Loan Losses (ALLL) leads
to higher deposit rates, while conservatism in Charge-Offs (CO) results in lower deposit
rates.
Within provisions, I find that non-discretionary provisions that have a direct impact
on bank profitability and solvency risk are priced by depositors, while the discretionary
provisions that signal managements’ private information are not priced to the same ex-
tent. Moreover, non-discretionary provisions that add to economic capital lead to lower
deposit rates, while discretionary provisions that add to economic capital lead to higher
deposit rates. These findings attest to the value of accounting information in reducing
the information asymmetry between a banks’ borrowers and depositors and lends support
to the concept of market discipline, a key pillar of the Basel accords.
76
References
Acharya, Viral V and Nada Mora (2015). “A crisis of banks as liquidity providers”. The
Journal of Finance 70.1, pp. 1–43.
Acharya, Viral and Hassan Naqvi (2012). “The seeds of a crisis: A theory of bank liquid-
ity and risk taking over the business cycle”. Journal of Financial Economics 106.2,
pp. 349–366.
Aguirregabiria, Victor, Robert Clark, Hui Wang, et al. (2017). The Geographic Flow of
Bank Funding and Access to Credit: Branch Networks and Local-Market Competition.
Tech. rep.
Ahmed, Anwer S, Bruce K Billings, et al. (2002). “The role of accounting conservatism
in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy and in reducing
debt costs”. The Accounting Review 77.4, pp. 867–890.
Ahmed, Anwer S., Carolyn Takeda, and Shawn Thomas (1999). “Bank loan loss provi-
sions: a reexamination of capital management, earnings management and signaling
effects”. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28.1, pp. 1–25.
Aiyar, Shekhar, Charles W Calomiris, and Tomasz Wieladek (2012). Does macro-pru
leak? Evidence from a UK policy experiment. Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Allen, Franklin, Elena Carletti, and Robert Marquez (2015). “Deposits and bank capital
structure”. Journal of Financial Economics 118.3, pp. 601–619.
Balboa, Marina, Germán López-Espinosa, and Antonio Rubia (2013). “Nonlinear dy-
namics in discretionary accruals: An analysis of bank loan-loss provisions”. Journal of
Banking & Finance 37.12, pp. 5186–5207.
Basel III, BCBS (2013). “The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and liquidity risk monitoring
tools”. Bank for International Settlements.
Beatty, Anne, Sandra L. Chamberlain, and Joseph Magliolo (1995). “Managing Finan-
cial Reports of Commercial Banks: The Influence of Taxes, Regulatory Capital, and
Earnings”. Journal of Accounting Research 33.2, pp. 231–261.
Beatty, Anne and Scott Liao (2011). “Do delays in expected loss recognition affect banks’
willingness to lend?” Journal of Accounting and Economics 52.1, pp. 1–20.
— (2014). “Financial accounting in the banking industry: A review of the empirical
literature”. Journal of Accounting and Economics 58.2, pp. 339–383.
77
Beaver, William H and Mohan Venkatachalam (1999). “Differential pricing of discre-
tionary, nondiscretionary and noise components of loan fair values”. Nondiscretionary
and Noise Components of Loan Fair Values.
Beaver, William and Ellen Engel (1996). “Discretionary behavior with respect to al-
lowances for loan losses and the behavior of security prices”. Journal of Accounting
and Economics 22.1, pp. 177–206.
Beck, Paul J and Ganapathi S Narayanamoorthy (2013). “Did the SEC impact banks’ loan
loss reserve policies and their informativeness?” Journal of Accounting and Economics
56.2, pp. 42–65.
Ben-David, Itzhak, Ajay Palvia, and Chester Spatt (2017). “Banks’ internal capital mar-
kets and deposit rates”. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 52.5, pp. 1797–
1826.
Berger, Allen N and Christa HS Bouwman (2009). “Bank liquidity creation”. The review
of financial studies 22.9, pp. 3779–3837.
— (2013). “How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?” Journal
of Financial Economics 109.1, pp. 146–176.
Berger, Allen N and John Sedunov (2017). “Bank liquidity creation and real economic
output”. Journal of Banking & Finance 81, pp. 1–19.
Berger, Allen N. and Gregory F. Udell (2002). “Small Business Credit Availability and
Relationship Lending: The Importance of Bank Organisational Structure”. The Eco-
nomic Journal 112.477, F32–F53.
Bhat, Vasanthakumar N (1996). “Banks and income smoothing: an empirical analysis”.
Applied Financial Economics 6.6, pp. 505–510.
Bhattacharya, Sudipto and Anjan V Thakor (1993). “Contemporary banking theory”.
Journal of financial Intermediation 3.1, pp. 2–50.
Bomberger, William A (1993). “Income, wealth, and household demand for deposits”. The
American Economic Review 83.4, pp. 1034–1044.
Bushman, Robert M (2014). “Thoughts on financial accounting and the banking industry”.
Journal of Accounting and Economics 58.2, pp. 384–395.
Bushman, Robert M and Christopher D Williams (2012). “Accounting discretion, loan
loss provisioning, and discipline of banks’ risk-taking”. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 54.1, pp. 1–18.
— (2015). “Delayed expected loss recognition and the risk profile of banks”. Journal of
Accounting Research 53.3, pp. 511–553.
78
Calomiris, Charles W. and Charles M. Kahn (1991a). “The Role of Demandable Debt in
Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements”. The American Economic Review 81.3,
pp. 497–513.
Calomiris, Charles W and Charles M Kahn (1991b). “The role of demandable debt in
structuring optimal banking arrangements”. The American Economic Review, pp. 497–
513.
Calomiris, Charles W and Joseph R Mason (1997). “Contagion and Bank Failures Dur-
ing the Great Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic”. The American
Economic Review 87.5, pp. 863–883.
— (2003). “Consequences of bank distress during the Great Depression”. American Eco-
nomic Review 93.3, pp. 937–947.
Campbel, Tim S and William A Kracaw (1980). “Information production, market signal-
ing, and the theory of financial intermediation”. The Journal of Finance 35.4, pp. 863–
882.
Chari, Varadarajan V and Ravi Jagannathan (1988). “Banking panics, information, and
rational expectations equilibrium”. The Journal of Finance 43.3, pp. 749–761.
Chen, Yehning and Iftekhar Hasan (2006). “The transparency of the banking system and
the efficiency of information-based bank runs”. Journal of Financial Intermediation
15.3, pp. 307–331.
Clair, Robert T (1992). “Loan growth and loan quality: some preliminary evidence from
Texas banks”. Economic Review-Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, p. 9.
Collins, Julie H, Douglas A Shackelford, and James M Wahlen (1995). “Bank differences
in the coordination of regulatory capital, earnings, and taxes”. Journal of accounting
research, pp. 263–291.
Cook, Douglas O and Lewis J Spellman (1994). “Repudiation risk and restitution costs:
toward understanding premiums on insured deposits”. Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 26.3, pp. 439–459.
Council, Federal Financial Institutions Examination (2006). A User’s Guide for the Uni-
form Bank Performance Report.
Dang, Tri Vi et al. (2017). “Banks as secret keepers”. American Economic Review 107.4,
pp. 1005–29.
Davis, Steven J and John Haltiwanger (1992). “Gross job creation, gross job destruction,
and employment reallocation”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 107.3, pp. 819–
863.
79
Davis, Steven J, John C Haltiwanger, Scott Schuh, et al. (1998). “Job creation and de-
struction”. MIT Press Books 1.
DeAngelo, Harry and René M Stulz (2015). “Liquid-claim production, risk management,
and bank capital structure: Why high leverage is optimal for banks”. Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics 116.2, pp. 219–236.
Dechow, Patricia, Weili Ge, and Catherine Schrand (2010). “Understanding earnings qual-
ity: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences”. Journal of
accounting and economics 50.2-3, pp. 344–401.
Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni and Pietro Garibaldi (2005). “Gross credit flows”. The Review of
Economic Studies 72.3, pp. 665–685.
Diamond, Douglas W. (1984). “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring”. The
Review of Economic Studies 51.3, pp. 393–414.
Diamond, Douglas W and Philip H Dybvig (1983). “Bank runs, deposit insurance, and
liquidity”. Journal of political economy 91.3, pp. 401–419.
Diamond, Douglas W and Raghuram G Rajan (2000). “A theory of bank capital”. The
Journal of Finance 55.6, pp. 2431–2465.
— (2001). “Banks and liquidity”. American Economic Review 91.2, pp. 422–425.
Driscoll, John and Ruth Judson (2013). “Sticky deposit rates”.
Egan, Mark, Ali Hortaçsu, and Gregor Matvos (2017). “Deposit competition and financial
fragility: Evidence from the us banking sector”. American Economic Review 107.1,
pp. 169–216.
Egan, Mark, Stefan Lewellen, and Adi Sunderam (2017). The cross section of bank value.
Tech. rep. National Bureau of Economic Research.
Elliott, John A, J Douglas Hanna, and Wayne H Shaw (1991). “The evaluation by the
financial markets of changes in bank loan loss reserve levels”. Accounting Review,
pp. 847–861.
FASB (1993). Accounting by Creditors for Impairment of a Loan: An Amendment of FASB
Statements No. 5 and 15. Financial Accounting Standards Board of the Financial
Accounting Foundation.
Foos, Daniel, Lars Norden, and Martin Weber (2010). “Loan growth and riskiness of
banks”. Journal of Banking & Finance 34.12, pp. 2929–2940.
Gatev, Evan and Philip E Strahan (2006). “Banks’ advantage in hedging liquidity risk:
Theory and evidence from the commercial paper market”. The Journal of Finance
61.2, pp. 867–892.
80
Gertler, Mark and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (2015). “Banking, liquidity, and bank runs in an
infinite horizon economy”. American Economic Review 105.7, pp. 2011–43.
Goldstein, Itay and Ady Pauzner (2005). “Demand–deposit contracts and the probability
of bank runs”. the Journal of Finance 60.3, pp. 1293–1327.
Gorton, Gary (1988). “Banking panics and business cycles”. Oxford economic papers 40.4,
pp. 751–781.
Graham, John R, Campbell R Harvey, and Shiva Rajgopal (2005). “The economic impli-
cations of corporate financial reporting”. Journal of accounting and economics 40.1-3,
pp. 3–73.
Griffin, Paul A and Samoa JR Wallach (1991). “Latin American lending by major US
banks: The effects of disclosures about nonaccrual loans and loan loss provisions”.
Accounting Review, pp. 830–846.
Heitz, Amanda and Ganapathi S Narayanamoorthy (2018). “Creditor Rights and Bank
Losses: A Cross-Country Comparison”.
Helwege, Jean, Nicole M Boyson, and Jan Jindra (2017). “Thawing frozen capital mar-
kets and backdoor bailouts: Evidence from the Fed’s liquidity programs”. Journal of
Banking & Finance 76, pp. 92–119.
Herrera, Ana Maria, Marek Kolar, and Raoul Minetti (2011). “Credit reallocation”. Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics 58.6-8, pp. 551–563.
Holmstrom, Bengt (2008). “Commentary: The Panic of 2007”. Proceedings-Economic Pol-
icy Symposium-Jackson Hole. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp. 263–273.
Holod, Dmytro and Joe Peek (2007). “Asymmetric information and liquidity constraints:
a new test”. Journal of Banking & Finance 31.8, pp. 2425–2451.
Iyer, Rajkamal and Manju Puri (2012). “Understanding bank runs: The importance
of depositor-bank relationships and networks”. American Economic Review 102.4,
pp. 1414–45.
Iyer, Rajkamal, Manju Puri, and Nicholas Ryan (2016). “A tale of two runs: Depositor
responses to bank solvency risk”. The Journal of Finance 71.6, pp. 2687–2726.
Jacklin, Charles J and Sudipto Bhattacharya (1988). “Distinguishing panics and information-
based bank runs: Welfare and policy implications”. Journal of Political Economy 96.3,
pp. 568–592.
Jiménez, Gabriel et al. (2017). “Macroprudential policy, countercyclical bank capital
buffers, and credit supply: evidence from the Spanish dynamic provisioning exper-
iments”. Journal of Political Economy 125.6, pp. 2126–2177.
81
Jin, Justin Yiqiang, Kiridaran Kanagaretnam, and Gerald J Lobo (2011). “Ability of
accounting and audit quality variables to predict bank failure during the financial
crisis”. Journal of Banking & Finance 35.11, pp. 2811–2819.
Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran, Gopal V Krishnan, and Gerald J Lobo (2010). “An empirical
analysis of auditor independence in the banking industry”. The Accounting Review
85.6, pp. 2011–2046.
Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran, Gerald J Lobo, and Dong-Hoon Yang (2004). “Joint tests of
signaling and income smoothing through bank loan loss provisions”. Contemporary
Accounting Research 21.4, pp. 843–884.
Kim, Myung-Sun and William Kross (1998). “The impact of the 1989 change in bank
capital standards on loan loss provisions and loan write-offs”. Journal of Accounting
and Economics 25.1, pp. 69–99.
Koehn, Michael and Anthony M Santomero (1980). “Regulation of bank capital and
portfolio risk”. The journal of finance 35.5, pp. 1235–1244.
Kothari, Sabino P, Susan Shu, and Peter D Wysocki (2009). “Do managers withhold bad
news?” Journal of Accounting Research 47.1, pp. 241–276.
Krishnamurthy, Arvind and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). “The aggregate demand
for treasury debt”. Journal of Political Economy 120.2, pp. 233–267.
— (2013). “Short-term debt and financial crises: What we can learn from US Treasury
supply”. unpublished, Northwestern University, May.
Laeven, Luc and Giovanni Majnoni (2003). “Loan loss provisioning and economic slow-
downs: too much, too late?” Journal of financial intermediation 12.2, pp. 178–197.
Ma, Christopher K (1988). “Loan loss reserves and income smoothing: The experience in
the US banking industry”. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 15.4, pp. 487–
497.
Martin, Christopher, Manju Puri, and Alexander Ufier (2018). Deposit Inflows and Out-
flows in Failing Banks: The Role of Deposit Insurance. Tech. rep. National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Martinez Peria, Maria Soledad and Sergio L Schmukler (2001). “Do depositors punish
banks for bad behavior? Market discipline, deposit insurance, and banking crises”.
The journal of finance 56.3, pp. 1029–1051.
Mehran, Hamid and Anjan Thakor (2011). “Bank capital and value in the cross-section”.
The Review of Financial Studies 24.4, pp. 1019–1067.
Meller, Barbara and Norbert Metiu (2017). “The synchronization of credit cycles”. Journal
of Banking & Finance 82, pp. 98–111.
82
Morris, Stephen and Hyun Song Shin (2002). “Social value of public information”. amer-
ican economic review 92.5, pp. 1521–1534.
Moyer, Susan E. (1990). “Capital adequacy ratio regulations and accounting choices in
commercial banks”. Journal of Accounting and Economics 13.2, pp. 123–154. issn:
0165-4101.
Ng, Jeffrey and Sugata Roychowdhury (2014). “Do loan loss reserves behave like capital?
Evidence from recent bank failures”. Review of Accounting Studies 19.3, pp. 1234–
1279.
Nichols, D Craig, James M Wahlen, and Matthew M Wieland (2009). “Publicly traded
versus privately held: implications for conditional conservatism in bank accounting”.
Review of Accounting Studies 14.1, pp. 88–122.
Nicoletti, Allison Kathleen (2016). “The effects of auditors and regulators on bank fi-
nancial reporting: evidence from loan loss provisions”. PhD thesis. The Ohio State
University.
Park, Sangkyun and Stavros Peristiani (1998). “Market discipline by thrift depositors”.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, pp. 347–364.
Peck, James and Karl Shell (2003). “Equilibrium bank runs”. Journal of political Economy
111.1, pp. 103–123.
Pérignon, Christophe, David Thesmar, and Guillaume Vuillemey (2018). “Wholesale
Funding Dry-Ups”. The Journal of Finance 73.2, pp. 575–617.
Postlewaite, Andrew and Xavier Vives (1987). “Bank runs as an equilibrium phenomenon”.
Journal of political Economy 95.3, pp. 485–491.
Repullo, Rafael (2004). “Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking”.
Journal of financial Intermediation 13.2, pp. 156–182.
Saunders, Anthony and Berry Wilson (1996). “Contagious bank runs: evidence from the
1929–1933 period”. Journal of Financial Intermediation 5.4, pp. 409–423.
Stiglitz, Joseph E and Andrew Weiss (1981). “Credit rationing in markets with imperfect
information”. The American economic review 71.3, pp. 393–410.
Uhlig, Harald (2010). “A model of a systemic bank run”. Journal of Monetary Economics
57.1, pp. 78–96.
Von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig (2004). “Bank capital adequacy regulation under the new
Basel Accord”. Journal of Financial Intermediation 13.2, pp. 90–95.
Wahlen, James M (1994). “The nature of information in commercial bank loan loss dis-
closures”. Accounting Review, pp. 455–478.
83
Appendix A. Variable Definitions
Table A. Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
LLP Loan Loss Provisionst / Loanst−1
L̂LP Fitted values from LLP model reflecting the non-discretionary component
of Loan Loss Provisions related to credit risk in the loan portfolio.
L̃LP Residual values from LLP model, reflection the discretionary component
of Loan Loss Provisions.
Timeliness Computed as the incremental R2 impact of including changes in current
and future non-performing loans in explaining LLPs. Higher incremen-
tal R2 indicates low DELR. Incremental R2 are ranked on distance from
mean incremental R2. Dummy =1 if Timeliness above median, 0 Oth-
erwise
PublicBHC Dummy =1 if Bank Holding Company is publicly listed, 0 Otherwise
High Loan Growth Computed as the rank of the distance between the 1-year loan growth
for each bank and the median value during that quarter. Dummy =1 if
1-Year loan growth above median, 0 Otherwise
EBTP Earnings Before Taxes and Provisionst / Loanst−1
High Earnings Computed as the rank of the distance between the 4-quarter moving av-
erage of EBTP for each bank and the median value during that quarter.
Dummy =1 if 4-quarter moving average of EBTP above median, 0 Oth-
erwise
NPA Non-Performing Assets: Sum of Loans past 90-days and accruing, Loans
in non-accrual status, and Other Real Estate Owned
ACLA NPAt/Loanst−1
ALLL Allowance for Loan and Lease Lossest/NPAt
CO Net Charge−Offst/NPAt
ALLL Conservatism Computed as the rank of the distance between 4-quarter moving average
ALLL measure for each bank and the median value during that quarter.
Dummy =1 if ALLL above median, 0 Otherwise
CO Conservatism Computed as the rank of the distance between 4-quarter moving average
CO measure for each bank and the median value during that quarter.
Dummy =1 if CO above median, 0 Otherwise
LoanConcentration Computed as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) for five loan cate-
gories, namely Commercial Real Estate (CRE) Loans, Commercial & In-
dustrial (C&I) Loans, Consumer Loans, Agricultural Loans, and Farm-
land Loans. Dummy =1 if Loan HHI above median, 0 Otherwise
CRE Loan Growth Computed as the rank of the distance between the 1-year CRE loan growth
for each bank and the median value during that quarter. Dummy =1 if
1-Year loan growth above median, 0 Otherwise
C&I Loan Growth Computed as the rank of the distance between the 1-year C&I loan growth
for each bank and the median value during that quarter. Dummy =1 if
1-Year loan growth above median, 0 Otherwise
Cons. Loan Growth Computed as the rank of the distance between the 1-year Consumer loan
growth for each bank and the median value during that quarter. Dummy
=1 if 1-Year loan growth above median, 0 Otherwise
ALLL Ratio (ALLL / 1.25% RWA). ALLL reserves up to 1.25% of Gross Risk
Weighted Assets (GRWA) is considered as part of Tier 2 Capital.
Econ. Capital Add Dummy =1 if ALLL Ratio ≥ 1, 0 Otherwise
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Figure B. Banks, Branches, and Total Deposits (1994 - 2017)
Figure B shows the number of commercial banks, bank branches and total deposits in
the US across time periods. The shaded regions are NBER recession periods. We see
that while the number of banks have declined from roughly 13,000 in 1994 to almost
5,800 by 2017, the number of branches have remained fairly consistent over time. The
number of commercial bank branches actually increased from roughly 81,000 in 1994 to
nearly 100,000 in 2009, before declining to almost 89,000 by 2017, albeit still higher than
the beginning-of-sample-period levels. It can also be seen that the total deposits in the
banking system have been consistently over time, from roughly $2.5 trillion ($4.3 trillion
in 2017 dollars) in 1994, to nearly $12 trillion in 2017. While mergers and bank failures
have largely been responsible for the consolidation in the banking industry, the entry and
exit of individual banks by themselves have little effect on the aggregate deposit flow
rates in the banking system.
85
Vita
Prateek Sharma was born in New Delhi, India. He attended Pune University where he
earned a Bachelor of Engineering in Electronics and Telecommunication Engineering, in
2004. Prateek earned a Masters in Finance and a Masters in Statistics from The Uni-
versity of Illinois - Urbana Champaign in 2011, and 2014 respectively. He entered the
Ph.D. program in the Finance department at Louisiana State University in 2015. His
research interests include banking and regulation, financial intermediaries, and financial
accounting and reposting. He is currently a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Phi-
losophy in Business Administration with a major in Finance, which is expected to be
awarded in August 2019. Prateek has accepted a visiting assistant professor position at
The University of St. Thomas, starting August 2019.
86
